

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XXVI. No. 3.

JULY, 1934

ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY¹

By G. C. ALLEN

IT is sometimes said that economists show an unworthy preference for the safe side of prophecy—for writing and speaking after the event. But I shall not be too rash, I hope, if I suggest that one of the main differences between the economic data with which Sir Edward Gonner and Professor J. R. Bellerby, my distinguished predecessors, had to deal during their tenure of this Chair and the economic data which will concern economists for the next two or three decades will be found in the violent change in Governmental economic policy that has taken place during the last few years. I am speaking now not merely of the reversion of this country to a protective system, for that is just a symptom of a deeper world change. I refer to the whole group of official measures which have been aimed at modifying the existing structure and organization of industry, at the regulation of prices and output and at the maintenance of a particular distribution of productive resources. We have seen, in fact, the drastic modification, in some countries the final overthrow, of that system of free enterprise which spread from Great Britain over a large part of the world in the nineteenth century. The attitude of the economists to these changes has been on the whole hostile; almost to a man, in this and

¹ Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Liverpool on May 4, 1934.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

in many other countries, they have condemned the chief manifestations of this policy,¹ even though some may have approved of it in principle. This disagreement between the economists and the politicians has caused some bewilderment among those who are in neither group. I thought, therefore, that this might be an appropriate occasion on which to discuss this divergence between theory and practice, and, at the same time, to reply to certain criticisms that are levelled against professional economists. The chief of the criticisms, to deal with these first, is the reproach of ineffectiveness. Why, it is asked, have the economists allowed the world to get into its present confusion? How is it that they are unable to produce some agreed solution for our troubles, instead of quarrelling among themselves about theories which the layman has not begun to understand, or indulging in purely destructive criticisms of the efforts of the politicians? The economists are compared very unfavourably with the physical scientists. The physical scientists too may be at sixes and sevens, doubtful about the validity of principles of which they were once sure. But they can at any rate give us results. Indeed, some people think that they are too successful in assisting us in our efforts to control natural forces. If the physical scientists, so it is argued, for all their theoretical differences, can solve our technical problems, why can't the economists solve our social and economic problems? What are economists for, if not for this? Surely, in economics as in other sciences, knowledge is desired chiefly as an instrument of control? Yet, say the critics, the economists spend their time in formulating more and more precise statements of formal relations between quantities, in working out an articulated system of equations, highly abstract and incomprehensible to the ordinary man. They may get some æsthetic pleasure out of this exercise, but

¹ This disapproval does not, of course, extend to the various methods of monetary "management" that have been applied. But this exception to the general rule of *laissez-faire* was countenanced even by the classical economists.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

are their conclusions relevant at the present time? ; does the abstract world they contemplate bear any relation to reality? It seems not ; for when they are asked for guidance on practical questions, their advice differs from economist to economist.

The reply which such a challenge elicits from the economist runs like this. First, in justifying his abstractions, he says that since controlled experiments are impossible to workers in the social sciences, he must employ some other method for isolating the forces which he desires to examine. The abstract deductive method enables him to do this. It may have its defects ; but these arise out of the nature of the subject-matter and the economist is not to blame for them.

To the complaint that the present condition of the world testifies to the ineffectiveness of economists, the answer is simply that since economists are not in control of affairs, they cannot be held responsible for the mistakes of those who are. Economists have been consulted by Governments on many occasions since 1918 ; but their advice has nearly always been ignored. The criticisms levelled by expert opinion against the economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles have now been proved to be justified ; but they were not accepted by Governments at a time when such an acceptance might have led to the avoidance of disaster. The folly of many of the official valorization schemes introduced to maintain prices at an artificial level was exposed by economists long before the collapse of those schemes and the intense depression that followed in agricultural countries made it apparent to all. The disastrous consequences of economic nationalism and of universal restrictions on the free movement of goods and persons have been emphasized repeatedly by economists ; and politicians, at at least two great international economic conferences, have accepted these views ; but the acceptance of this diagnosis as sound has had no effect whatever on political action. It seems that politicians, and indeed the public, look to the economist to

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

provide not impartial advice and unbiased criticism but, rather, a theoretical justification for whatever policy is at the moment being pressed forward.

There is finally the complaint that economists have been far from unanimous in their advice on practical affairs, and in this complaint there is some justification. Yet differences among economists have been grossly exaggerated. On many of the fundamental issues, such as those I have already mentioned, there has been a large measure of agreement among them. But certainly there have been, and are, important conflicts of opinion. Yet here, I would suggest, many of the main differences have been in connexion with matters in which unanimity is not to be expected at the present time among any body of men. When an economist is asked for advice on most questions of policy, his reply involves not merely economic analysis but also a judgment of what is politically practicable and politically desirable. And economists, like other men, may differ in these political judgments while agreeing in their economic analysis. For example, the conflict of opinion among economists over Great Britain's return to the gold standard in 1925 depended largely on whether or not it was considered possible, or desirable, for the country to implement the costs-deflation implied by that policy—a political judgment. Yet if the economist should set out all the political and ethical assumptions underlying his answer to every practical question, he would be called pedantic.

Nor is it to be expected that the economists should spend much of their time in discussing the fallacious explanations of our troubles which are so popular at the present time. The argument that the trade depression is due to the increased efficiency of the productive machine and that we should become richer if we produced less; the argument that all would be well if our Governments made available unlimited supplies of currency; the view that a favourable balance of trade is more important than the total volume

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

of trade ; the argument of Mr. Walter Elliott that agriculture is superior to industry because in agriculture nature works with man¹ ; his more novel contention that, owing to technical improvements, international trade is unnecessary because things can now be produced equally well anywhere, and the remarkable conclusion to which he comes, namely, that it is necessary for the Government to impose drastic restrictions to prevent people from buying imports which, according to his argument, they would have no advantage in buying anyhow ;—arguments of this kind have been disposed of by a multitude of economists in the course of the last century and a half, and the modern economist is perhaps unduly reluctant to repeat the refutations that he finds in the works of his predecessors.

Now these answers to the criticisms levelled against the economists are, I think, incontrovertible. But they raise another question. Much of what I have said was true of economists in the early nineteenth century, when they were able to give answers to practical questions with some degree of unanimity and, what is more, when their advice was accepted as a guide to policy. How can we explain the contrast between the enormous prestige and influence of economics in the generation following Ricardo and the position to-day ? The contrast is indeed surprising, especially as the apparatus of economic enquiry has been greatly improved since that time. Yet from the end of the eighteenth century throughout the classical period the doctrines of the orthodox school were accepted by statesmen and were embodied in legislation. It is easy to find examples of this. In France the liberal measures of the last years of the *ancien régime* gave expression to the views of Turgot and the Physiocrats. The younger Pitt was immensely influenced by Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. The Poor Law of 1834 reflected the doctrines of Malthus. McCulloch supplied arguments which showed the economic advantage of large-scale

¹ See *The Listener*, October 4, 1933, p. 506.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

farming and so weakened the resistance to the agricultural changes then going on. The Bank Charter Act of 1844 clearly revealed the economists' influence, and their arguments in favour of *laissez-faire* helped to destroy the restrictions on private enterprise, the privileges of the landed oligarchy, and the protective system. And the influence of economics was not confined to statesmen; through the agency of Miss Martineau's tales it permeated the general public. It was a popular study.

Now undoubtedly one important reason for the prestige enjoyed by classical economics was that its doctrines coincided with the interests of the new industrial and commercial class that was just rising to power. This class stood to benefit from a liberal trading policy and from the abolition of restrictions imposed by a Government that was administratively inefficient and under the control of a landed aristocracy. The economists provided the theoretical justification for the policy of this new class. The Ricardian analysis of distribution, for example, demonstrated that the interest of the landed proprietors was necessarily antagonistic to that of other classes, and this analysis accorded well with the political cleavage of the times and supplied the arguments directed against the Corn Laws by both working-class and middle-class leaders.

But this was not the only cause of the economists' authority. Economic doctrine was then infused with the spirit of the times. There was no need then for the economist to make explicit the political or psychological assumptions which underlay his science, for the science was part of philosophic radicalism, the creed of the majority of the progressive thinkers. The economist found no difficulty in offering advice on practical questions, nor need he fear that his judgment would be derided by a fellow expert, for the same political bias was common to all the protagonists of the science. As part of the dominant political philosophy, economics was strengthened by its contacts with other social

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

studies which derived from the same source. The principle of utility which Bentham expounded formed the psychological foundation of economics, and this principle seemed an appropriate basis for a science since, as it has been said, it appeared to differ from other moral precepts in that it was the expression "not of a subjective preference of the moralist but of an objective law of human nature." The atomistic view of the State which these thinkers held was a view implicit in the current economic teaching. The close relationship between the economists and the Utilitarians is forcibly demonstrated by a parallel consideration of Bentham's theory of punishment and Smith's theory of value. The "natural" measure of punishment results, according to Bentham, from a comparison between the amount of physical suffering inflicted by the judge and the amount of physical suffering which results from the act classed as a crime. The "natural" measure of value, according to Smith, results from a comparison between the amount of pain suffered to produce an object and the amount of pleasure which is expected to result from the acquisition of that object.¹ These two thinkers were clearly surveying very different fields of study from the same point of view. In the sphere of jurisprudence Austin, and in history Buckle, worked within the same philosophical tradition. Even the theory of evolution was influenced by Darwin's reflections on the Malthusian principle of population. Thus in the early nineteenth century economics was part of a large group of studies bound together by the same underlying principles. It was part of philosophic radicalism and as such it accepted the political ends of that school. It accepted the thesis of the natural identity of individual and social interests²; it based itself on an atomistic view of the State and a hedonistic psychology. The policy it advocated was at bottom a

¹ E. Halévy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*, p. 94.

² That is, broadly speaking. Without qualification this statement would not be true of all the classical economists.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

policy of *laissez-faire*, freedom of individual contract and the abolition of restrictions on the movement of goods and persons. And this policy was in accordance with the interests of a powerful class and with the prevailing tendency in other social studies.¹ Little wonder, then, that the classical economists were able to influence policy. Publicists, or perhaps I should say prophets, like Carlyle and Ruskin, novelists like Dickens and Disraeli, satirists like Peacock, might scorn the Utilitarians and the economists. Yet they could do little to stem the tide when the only alternative seemed to be a maintenance of the authoritarian and mercantilist State.

To-day the situation is widely different. No powerful party or social class believes that its interests are to be fostered by a pursuance of the policy of the philosophic

¹ I wish to make it clear that in this article I am not concerned with attacking the psychology or the political theory of the classical school, but only with an attempt to explain why economics was accepted as a guide to policy in the nineteenth century, and why its doctrines are ignored to-day. Explanations, resembling that which is given here, of the influence exercised by the classical economists have been offered by several writers, notably by Professor W. C. Mitchell in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 1914, p. 1, and in his contribution to R. G. Tugwell's *The Trend of Economics* (1924). But Professor Mitchell is chiefly concerned with emphasizing the weakness of the psychology of the classical economists, and in doing so, he seems rather to under-estimate the great achievements of that school. The achievements of those economists, indeed, suggest that their psychology and political theory satisfied the pragmatic test and, though no longer acceptable, formed a basis for the science that was at any rate provisionally useful and valid. And it should be added that as yet a new psychological basis for economics—a basis which should form the starting-point for further fruitful enquiries—is still undiscovered. But it is very significant that an economist with the particular interests of Professor Mitchell should have engaged in this controversy. The late Professor Allyn Young, in discussing the articles mentioned above, expressed surprise that an economist whose own work in the "applied" field "fits into and amplifies the general structure of economic knowledge that has been built up . . . during the last century and a half," and whose assumptions and modes of thought are such as are familiar to economists, should criticize so adversely the general structure of theoretical economics "of which the best of his own work seems to be an integral part." (See *Economic Problems New and Old*, pp. 250 *et seq.*) But surely the economist whose tasks lie mainly in the "applied" field, who must rely on others to provide the theoretical apparatus necessary for his work, is the very person who is likely to be most conscious of the defects of that "general structure." The realistic economist must use whatever apparatus of theory is available; he must seize whatever tool comes to his hand; but more than anyone else he is likely to realize its imperfections for dealing, to his own satisfaction, with the facts which his experience and his investigations bring to light.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

radicals. The social evils that accompanied the rise of modern industrialism have discredited *laissez-faire* in the minds of progressive thinkers. The psychologists have abandoned hedonism, and a new conception of the State has replaced that of the Utilitarians. In economic policy, with our tariffs and trade restrictions, with our concern for that odd and ancient fetish the balance of trade, with our talk of self-sufficient empires, we are back in the seventeenth century. For the moment, indeed, the world seems to have abandoned even its belief in individual liberty as it was understood in the nineteenth century, and to be drawing its inspiration from policies which have no basis in reason at all, although doubtless the leaders of the dominant movements would defend themselves by saying, like Mr. Mystic in Peacock's *Melincourt*, that they do not expect anyone but themselves to see the connexion of their ideas, as they arrange their thoughts on an entirely new principle.

Now these changes in allied studies and in the world of fact have naturally affected economics. And a glance at some of these effects will reveal a source of weakness in the subject. One result has been to rob the economist of a working psychology. The classical economists who accepted the current "pleasure and pain" psychology developed a theory of real cost. The end of production could be regarded as the pleasures or satisfactions received from goods; while labour (together with the so-called "abstinence" of the capitalist) represented the "pain" of this process, and this "pain" was equivalent to the *real cost* of production. Pleasures and pains, it was argued, formed the ultimate quantities in economics. But this analysis was necessarily modified when the inadequacy of hedonistic psychology was demonstrated, with the result that the idea of "real cost" has tended to disappear from economics. Among many modern economists the real cost of production of any article means merely the value of other goods which might have been produced instead of it by the capital and labour

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

employed. It is a conception of displaced alternatives ; as one economist has said, the real cost of obtaining anything is what must be surrendered in order to get it.¹ This is an entirely different conception from the old idea of real cost ; for according to Smith " the real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it." ² Similarly, in dealing with demand, a large body of modern economists no longer base their analysis on utility, but confine their attention to the objective facts of consumers' preferences as revealed in the market.

The changed point of view is very clearly brought out in the writings of one of the younger English theorists who declares that economics is not concerned with ends at all, but only with the means by which the ends set for itself by society may be most economically realized. He says further that modern economics is based on the objective phenomena of the market—not on any assumption about the nature of man.³ This interpretation means that economics should cut itself off from a psychological background and should abandon its positive doctrines. By a development of this kind the economist can make his science more objective, more abstract and more universal than it was formerly. But it may be doubted whether this change really represents an advance. It has certainly helped to rob the economist of his popular influence and has rendered him less able than his predecessors to give a guide to policy. To this the answer is sometimes given that economics is not concerned with giving a guide to policy ; it ought to be classed rather with the physical sciences. With this view I disagree. There is a fundamental difference between the physical and the social sciences. When the physical scientist formulates a hypothesis or discovers a law governing the relationship

¹ L. Robbins, " Certain Aspects of the Theory of Costs " in the *Economic Journal*, March 1934, p. 2.

² *The Wealth of Nations* (ed. Cannan), vol. i, p. 32.

³ L. Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, *passim*.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

between things, he does not thereby alter that relationship. The course of the stars is not, so far as we know, changed in any way by the theories that astronomers have held about their movements. But when the economist formulates a theory, he is liable to alter the data on which he is working. Let me give one or two examples. There can be little doubt that the attempt of the early economists to destroy the dualism established by tradition between the public and the private interest, their theory that the best means of promoting the social well-being was to allow self-interest free play, greatly strengthened the operation of the self-regarding instinct by making it respectable and so helped to establish the reign of *laissez-faire*. To take another example, whether we agree or not with Marx's view of the part played by class struggles in social evolution, there is no doubt that his theory has helped to intensify class consciousness since his time, and so has affected the subsequent social and political history of the world. Thus, economics must necessarily be more than a scientific enquiry into the relations between certain quantities; the economist cannot leave ends out of account when he is theorizing, for (whether he likes it or not) his work may help to determine what those ends shall be.

So far, then, from regarding the divorce of economics from political theory and psychology as an advance I think that this divorce accounts for some of the ineffectiveness of modern economics. Undoubtedly the modern science is far superior to classical economics in its analysis of the major theoretical problems; it is a more powerful instrument for analysing the conditions of a given situation; it is admirable as a weapon of destructive criticism—for bringing to light inconsistencies in the different parts of national economic policy, and for showing the inconsistency between the policy aimed at and the means by which Governments attempt to carry out the policy. But it is weaker than the classical school on the constructive side, because it is not based, as the

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

older economics was based, on a widely accepted social and political philosophy, and because it has no coherent and explicit theory of how people act. That economists feel this lack is shown by the fact that when they leave the realm of pure theory and pass on to deal with applied problems they are forced to make political and psychological assumptions. These assumptions tend to be the assumptions of the classical school—an atomistic State, a hedonistic psychology and a cosmopolitan world. The economist comes trailing his clouds of philosophic radicalism into a world that is drifting farther and farther from belief in that doctrine. So, that part of his teaching which is independent of these philosophical obsessions¹ and which demonstrates the inconsistency of modern economic policy and the unforeseen consequences attendant on particular action is unheeded, because the standpoint as a whole is discredited.

I should like to illustrate this point by referring to the formal analysis of value. It is the fashion among an important school of economists to base their analysis of value on the objective facts of demand, rather than on utility. In other words, consumers' preferences as expressed in the amount of money which they offer for various goods are regarded as the basic quantities with which the economist must deal. Now in pure theory there is no need to associate the consumer's preferences with the satisfaction which he receives for his outlay of money—the latter is a matter of psychological speculation, the former is a fact which can be observed in the market. But when the economist passes on to deal with questions of social policy and with the distribution of resources in the real world, he necessarily introduces the idea of satisfaction resulting from these economic processes. He is bound to do so, since in dealing with social policy we are supposed to be dealing with an "ought to be" as well as with an "is." Many economists argue (when they reach

¹ There are, of course, many economic problems for the treatment of which psychological or philosophical considerations are irrelevant.

this point) that when consumers' preferences are free, then, on the whole and with some qualifications, resources will be distributed in the most economical and desirable fashion, and that any interference with this free choice, except in certain specified conditions, will reduce the total satisfactions enjoyed by the individuals who make up society. It follows then that State planning, as it is called, will necessarily reduce these satisfactions, since that implies an arbitrarily-judged decision concerning the distribution of resources. The presumption remains then in favour of *laissez-faire*. But this antithesis between production according to arbitrarily-judged needs and production according to the actual wants of individuals as determined by their free offers of money for goods is not really so sharp as it appears. The State must necessarily exercise an arbitrary influence on the nature of production whether it wishes to or not. Consumers' preferences, the sort of things that people buy, would be different from what they are at present if the distribution of wealth were different, and the distribution of wealth is largely determined by institutional factors, such as the laws of property and inheritance. Furthermore, consumers' preferences depend in some measure on the nature of the persuasive influences that are brought to bear on the public. If the State had not taught us all to read since 1870, consumers' preferences would be very different from what they are now, since the influence of advertisement and the Press in canalizing the demand for goods would be less than it is, and the demand for those goods and services which lend themselves to written advertisement would not have increased so fast as it has done. New wants are cultivated by a process of education, and clearly wants will be different if we leave this educative process in the hands of salesmen, advertisers, press lords and cinema magnates from what they would be if the educative process were in the hands of some other agency. The absolute character of the consumers' preferences, of the consumers' freedom of choice, disappears the moment we

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

introduce these considerations, and the impossibility of ruling out ethical and psychological considerations from any analysis of an applied problem is at once apparent. As one of the most stimulating of the American writers has implied,¹ we may very well drift towards social and biological disaster if we are left with this so-called freedom to acquire what salesmen and advertisers make us think we want. If so, where are the satisfactions which consumers' preferences are supposed to represent?

The reply of a fashionable school of economists to arguments of this kind is that they are not concerned with these larger social and psychological problems. All they attempt to do is to state the conditions of equilibrium given a certain scale of consumers' preferences. To this I would say that economics must be more than a series of equations, and that if it is to provide any guide to policy, as I think it should, it cannot leave psychological and social considerations out of account. In practice, economists of all schools admit this implicitly whenever they attempt to deal with current problems. I hope I have made clear what the dilemma of the modern economist is. It is that if he clings to the older traditional treatment of these problems, his enquiry is partly vitiated by the weakness of his psychology and the lack of any guiding political principle. If he contents himself with a statement of the conditions of equilibrium given a certain scale of consumers' preferences, if he cuts adrift from his hedonistic psychology, then, as an acute critic of modern economics has said, he becomes incapable of passing any judgment on the distribution of resources in the actual world.²

Another change which has occurred since the days of Ricardo, a change which has, as yet, insufficiently influenced the corpus of economic theory, has been the alteration in the underlying social situation. Economic science was built up

¹ Professor J. M. Clark.

² M. Dobb, "The Problems of a Socialist Economy," in the *Economic Journal*, December 1933, p. 590.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

at a time when industrial society was only just beginning to assume its modern form. At a time when the country was emerging from the age-long poverty of the agricultural state it was clearly desirable, in the interests of the maximization of the national income, that labour should be drawn into those employments where its productivity was greatest. Such restrictions on labour mobility as were due to ignorance, habit or legislation seemed clearly mischievous and demanded abolition. Further, the weakness of Trade Unions and the labour movement as a whole, the undemocratic nature of the Government and the inarticulateness of the masses, meant that labour's own resistance to the pressure of economic forces was weak. When changes in technique or demand required a redistribution of labour among other employments, then economic forces could be left to bring this about. Workers were driven out of industries in which they were no longer needed, by starvation wages and unemployment as well as by a desire to better themselves in the new higher-wage occupations. The social consequences of these changes to particular groups might be regarded as regrettable ; but they were considered inevitable, and in the long run, salutary. This was the normal method by which the price system secured a more effective distribution of labour, the normal method of providing for an increase in the national income. Resistances of workers, or employers, to movements of this kind could be treated as "frictions"—as temporary interferences with the working of economic laws, and they would, it was thought, tend to disappear as men became more rational and better able to follow the dictates of enlightened self-interest. But to-day, as we know, these "frictions" have developed into rigidities. Social resistances to these economic changes can no longer be ignored. They are part and parcel of the situation which the economist has to examine.¹

Some economists, however, are unwilling to admit this.

¹ In this connexion the increasing attention which is being given by theorists to conditions of "imperfect competition" is significant.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

They say : " Our job is merely to describe the economic conditions inherent in a particular situation. We are not concerned with social policy. For example, if a particular country loses some of its advantages as a producer, then its labour and capital can only be fully employed if incomes are reduced. If this reduction is resisted a chronic depression is inevitable." This type of argument was common during the last decade—before the onset of the world depression. It was said that the main cause of the chronic unemployment experienced by Great Britain during the post-war period was due to the fact that wages were too high. A reduction of wages—and of other rigid incomes too—was the proper method of restoring employment. Two of the things which were preventing this wage-adjustment and the redistribution of labour that was necessary were Unemployment Insurance and the strength of the Trade Unions. So, it was argued, the proper policy to be pursued was to modify the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance and the Trade Union Acts, and then wage rigidity would disappear. Now I will suggest that, even if this diagnosis were correct, the solution here set out was totally unreal. Unemployment Insurance and the present status of the Trade Unions are the product of a particular stage of social and economic development. An attack on them, given the circumstances of the post-war decade, would necessarily have led to a social upheaval, just as the attempt to reduce wages in 1926 did. They were properly to be regarded as institutional facts of which account must be taken in analyzing the situation and in formulating remedies for it. In the early nineteenth century the situation was such that in practical questions of this kind it was possible to isolate economic from social and political phenomena. Subsequent developments have made this an unreal treatment of a concrete situation such as the one I have mentioned.

As another example of the argument I am advancing, let us consider the American agricultural situation. Long before

the present slump set in, many groups among the American agriculturists were suffering severely from the competition of lower-cost producers, and this is a world in which the demand for many types of raw materials is very inelastic. The orthodox remedy for a situation of this kind is to rely on bankruptcy and lowered incomes to drive the high-cost producers from the industry until its size has been reduced to that required by the new situation. But this process is bound to be slow among farmers and small highly-specialized raw-material producers, since it is difficult for them to transfer their activities elsewhere and to find new uses for their land. Further, in a democratic country, the distressed producers can exert a much stronger pressure on the Government than could the English peasant or handloom weaver a century ago. So the Government was forced by political pressure to respond to this situation by instituting valorization schemes for the purpose of raising the price of the commodity to a level which would satisfy the farmer and so relieve him at the expense of the public. This, of course, provided no remedy for the situation. In fact, it intensified the problem in the long run, for higher prices at once induced consumers to buy less and producers to produce more, as Mr. Elliott has since found in this country. The result in America was an accumulation of unsold stocks and, ultimately, a collapse of prices, with disastrous consequences to all the members of the artificially swollen industries. Now the economist had no difficulty in showing the absurdity of remedies of this kind. He has rightly attributed to this type of Governmental interference with economic processes the main responsibility for the intensity and duration of the present depression. But the traditional remedy of the *laissez-faire* economist—to allow economic forces to work themselves out in the way I have described—was not one that the social and political situation of the time permitted.

Again, let us consider the American Recovery Programme. Many parts of this, though not all of course, seem to depend

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

on a mass of economic fallacies. Yet the economist has difficulty in discovering a practical alternative. The view of one important group of economists, that economic forces should have been left to produce the liquidation which would create the conditions for recovery, is a view that takes no account of the temper of the American people last spring. Many of the things that President Roosevelt is doing may retard recovery and may inflict serious damage on the American economic system. But to have done nothing, to have pursued a *laissez-faire* policy, might very well have produced a social upheaval in the United States which would have left no economic system worth having.

Professor Gregory, having in mind certain criticisms of this kind, has replied to them in the following passage. He says :

"Why has the depression which set in in the autumn of 1929 lasted so much longer than the depressions of the nineteenth century? I answer unhesitatingly, because the precedent boom was allowed to go on unchecked to a much greater extent, and because, again, in the name of 'stabilization,' the necessary corrective measures have not been applied. Instead of insisting upon the vital necessity of greater flexibility, an increasing degree of *inflexibility* in all directions has characterized the last four years.

"It is no answer to say that the measures which would have cured the depression, had they been applied, were impossible of application because 'public opinion would not have tolerated them.' No doubt patients very often refuse to follow the advice given them by their doctors, but if they subsequently die their death is not usually regarded as evidence of the inherent wickedness of the advice given."¹

Now the analogy of the doctor and the patient might be true enough if society represented a single interest, if there were no conflict of interest among different social classes, if the losses occasioned by economic readjustment and liquidation of the type he has in mind fell equally on all members of

¹ T. E. Gregory, "Economic Theory and Human Liberty," in *Economic Essays in Honour of Gustav Cassel*, p. 241.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

society, or at any rate on the shoulders of those responsible for the mistakes, *so that no sense of injustice was aroused in the process*. In fact, of course, the sufferings occasioned by the orthodox remedy would necessarily be partial in their incidence. The structure of industry being as it is, members of over-expanded industries would be condemned to desperately low incomes and huge capital losses for a very long period—until the necessary readjustments had been secured. And this the members of these industries consider unjust—they think that their burdens should be shared by society as a whole, since the over-expansion in the first place may have been due to the pursuance of a particular monetary policy by the State for which they were not responsible. So far as this attitude is common, and given the present distribution of political power, I should say, then, that Professor Gregory's analogy is misleading, and that the orthodox measures which he favours are rather of the nature of the operation which is certain to cure the specific disease, but which is likely to kill the patient with the shock to his constitution.

In this connexion the degree of flexibility which it is reasonable to expect from a modern society is a most important question, but one that has scarcely been discussed. The economist has rightly emphasized the absurdity of the common expectation that society can enjoy both stability (or security) and at the same time rapid economic progress. If we are determined to press on with technical change and so to enjoy the benefits of greater cheapness, and if we expect to be able to indulge freely a capricious demand for ever-changing classes of goods, then we must be prepared for violent and frequent fluctuations in the fortunes of different groups of producers, for frequent redistributions of labour and capital among different employments, for great changes in the relative economic importance of different localities and different countries—in a word, for extreme flexibility in our social and economic life. The troubles that have overwhelmed us in the last few years are due largely to the fact

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

that society has been unwilling or unable to develop the flexibility which is a necessary accompaniment of rapid economic change. In this diagnosis there is no doubt but that the orthodox economist is correct. The vested interests of particular groups of capitalists or wage-earners cannot be regarded as sacred in a society that demands this progress and this freedom. But the question that arises immediately is how far is society willing, or able, to sacrifice its social and political ideals (for flexibility implies this sacrifice) in order to enjoy greater wealth and greater freedom in its choice of goods. Is rapid economic progress compatible with the type of social organization that we possess at present? Is it possible to reconcile the present economic system and the present social and political policy? Can we realize the benefits of one without abandoning the ideals implicit in the other? Here is a conflict that was not apparent in the days of the classical school. A modern economist with his eye on the economic dislocation caused by the failure of Governments and peoples to accept the conditions inherent in a progressive economy of the modern type may conclude that the abolition of the "rigidities" is the only solution. Yet these "rigidities" are largely an expression of deep-seated political loyalties and conceptions of social justice, which are just as real as the economic forces with which they often come into conflict. To borrow a parable from Mr. D. H. Robertson—one which he employs in talking of some of the remedies that have been proposed for dealing with the trade cycle: "When I am killed by a motor car in the streets of London, my slayer may maintain that the accident happened because of my 'rigidity,' because I was too slow in getting out of the way; but my indignant relatives will probably remain of the opinion that it happened because the motor car came so fast that given my limited powers of rapid movement, I had no possible chance of escaping."¹

The inconsistency between the principles underlying our

¹ Slightly adapted!

ECONOMIC SCIENCE

economic system and those governing our social and political policy is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that the full consequences of economic actions are never clearly before us at the point when decisions are made. As a result, technical progress, in itself desirable, leads to social developments which are entirely unforeseen and undesired. In a world in which the majority of people, even if all our present productive resources were fully employed, would have insufficient wealth to enable them to enjoy a civilized existence, we naturally approve of the technical progress which makes us wealthier and gives us more complicated and therefore more interesting lives ; but we disapprove most heartily of many of the social changes which our new technique provokes. For example, we are anxious to be able to buy our basic food-stuffs more cheaply, and so we applaud the increasing efficiency of agricultural technique ; but we are inclined to look with disfavour on the rural depopulation and the decay of agriculture in those parts of the world least favourable for the application of that technique, although those are the inevitable consequences of the improvements. Under the present economic system man is always getting changes which he did not foresee or desire in company with (and necessarily so) changes of which he approves. Now within the price system there exists no method of balancing the advantages and disadvantages of any change so that they are clearly before the individual (or the collection of individuals) whose actions determine the change. For the benefits of the change come as measurable financial gains to individuals as consumers or as wage-earners or profit-earners. And it is individuals—individual consumers seeking by their purchase in the market to satisfy their wants more effectively and cheaply, and individual wage-earners and profit-earners seeking to improve the returns to their efforts—who determine what the change shall be. But the losses—the unforeseen and undesired results of the change—are of necessity left out of account in the calculations of these individuals,

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

for the losses accrue to the social system as a whole, or to particular groups within it ; and as these losses are often not measurable financial losses, they cannot be evaluated in the same terms as the gains. When the losses or the burdens due to the change become intolerable—usually long after the change has taken place—society, or the part of it adversely affected, takes defensive action through its political machinery. And the corrective measures which it adopts often destroy many of the advantages accompanying the technical change and produce the sort of chaos which we have at present. The only way out of this difficulty seems to be, as an American economist has put it, that public control, if it is to be at all useful, should be instituted at the point where the decisions are being made in the economic system itself.¹ Governmental interference has been so clumsy and harmful during the past decade because it has proceeded on the opposite principle—of leaving those decisions to be made by individuals in the market and then of attempting to remedy unforeseen or undesired consequences by palliative measures long afterwards. Exactly how that control is to be instituted, whether, taking Governments as they are, it is likely to be effectively and wisely exercised, are questions far too large for me to discuss now. But the suggestion I have indicated seems to be the only *logical* method of avoiding the disastrous consequences of the conflict between the principles underlying our economic system and our social and political ideals. I think that this is the line of action which communities will have to consider in the future. But we are not likely to advance very far towards a solution of these problems until we have a much clearer conception of the ends we wish to promote than we have at present, and until we have abandoned the fatuous pursuit, on which we are now engaged, of economic and political and social ends that are inconsistent with one another.

¹ See J. M. Clark, "The Socializing of Economics," in *The Trend of Economics* (ed. R. G. Tugwell), p. 100.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND— THE END OF TWO CHAPTERS

By HERBERT HEATON

IN these days of disillusion the end of many characteristic features of the nineteenth century is being announced. We have been told of the end of *laissez-faire*, of rugged individualism, of democracy, and Sombart reports that capitalism has passed into the phase of falling hair, decayed teeth, and senility. To add to the list is presumptuous and risky, yet two great chapters in the modern history of the white races seem to have drawn to a close within the last two decades, and the story of Greater Europe in the years ahead must therefore be different from that of last century. Those chapters are (1) the large-scale migration of Europeans to America, the Antipodes, and Asiatic Russia; and (2) the alienation by governments and occupation by settlers of great areas of cheap or free land in those continents.

How large each movement was cannot be measured accurately; the figures for land settlement are roughly reliable, but those on migration are full of pitfalls.¹ As far as can be estimated, 55,000,000 persons left Europe between 1820 and 1924. The British Isles lost 19,000,000, Italy 9,500,000, Germany 6,000,000, Austria-Hungary 5,000,000, Spain 4,000,000, and Scandinavia 2,000,000. Russia sent at least 3,000,000 westward and 5,000,000 eastward. The United States took 36,000,000 of these migrants, but 10,000,000 of them went back home; the Argentine got 5,500,000, Canada 4,500,000, and Brazil nearly 4,000,000. In the eighteenth century the exodus was probably not much more than 20,000 a year; it climbed unevenly, with sudden halts and steep declines, and reached its peak between 1900 and 1914.

¹ The most ambitious study of migration is Willcox, W. F. (editor), *International Migrations* (National Bureau of Economic Research, N.Y., 1929, 1931). See also "Migrations, Modern," by I. Ferenczi, in *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. x.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

In the first ten years of this century the United States received 8,800,000 new-comers and kept two-thirds of them. Canada admitted nearly 3,000,000 during the prairie boom between 1900 and 1914.¹ The Argentine received over 2,500,000 persons, and in spite of the Italian's propensity for going back home she kept three-fifths of the new arrivals. Between 1896 and 1914 3,500,000 peasants went to Siberia, while Australia, after fifteen weary years of drought and depression, recorded a net immigration of 280,000 between 1909 and 1913. Thus the War came at a time when inter-continental migration had reached unprecedented dimensions, when the regions which had formerly been unattractive in comparison with the United States were at last finding favour, and when Central and Eastern Europe had developed a mobility which made even the Irish seem a sedentary people.

The War checked this flood. Entries into the United States fell from 1,200,000 in 1913-14 to 100,000 in 1917-18; those into Canada dropped from 402,000 in 1913 to 79,000—mostly Americans—in 1918. The flow to Australia, being mostly British in origin, dried up. With peace the rush to the United States threatened once more to become a stampede, with 800,000 arrivals in 1921 and 700,000 in 1924; but the imposition of quota restrictions turned what had been for three centuries a wide-open door into a carefully guarded turnstile. Canadian entries climbed above the 100,000 mark, but the highest figure—that of 168,000 in 1929—was only two-fifths of the pre-War record; and the net immigration to Australia hovered between 35,000 and 50,000 during the 'twenties. But the steamship fares to each dominion were now two or three times as much as in the old days; in each country opportunities for getting cheap land or quickly finding a job were much more scarce, and in each there was a growing dislike of the immigrant, increasing dissatisfaction at the costly developments and assistance needed

¹ Of these, a million came from the United States. How many passed on into the United States cannot be estimated.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

to transport and settle him, and a desire to follow the United States in at least partly closing the door. The depression gave a sharper edge to this desire, destroyed whatever attractions the new world had offered, created unemployment problems at least as serious as those known in Europe, and even turned a net influx into a net outflow.¹ More serious still, it made painfully apparent the fact that the exhaustion of the fertile lands, the mechanization of industry, and the attitude of urban labour have brought to an end the day of large-scale migration to the United States and the dominions.

The forces which moved over 50,000,000 Europeans can be divided into those which pushed and those which pulled. The dislocations caused by changes in industrial equipment, by the aftermath of the Napoleonic War, and by the violent trade fluctuations of the eighteen-twenties and thirties stirred a desire to escape from England. Many a victim of "technological unemployment," army veteran, bankrupt farmer, or disillusioned radical decided that Great Britain had nothing more to offer him. The croppers of Leeds, starving because depression and shearing-frames had destroyed their jobs, formed an association in 1819 to make plans and collect funds for emigration. The Irish potato famine was probably the biggest single factor in the history of modern migration. In Germany political unrest and the emancipation of the peasants played their part; if emancipation freed the serf from the land it also freed the land from the serf, allowed the landlord to regain control of his estate, or burdened the farmer with heavy charges for the acres he retained. A series of crop failures in the 'forties and 'fifties, coming just when emancipation was being completed, brought bankruptcy, dispossession, and desire for escape.² In Scandinavia the pressure of population on limited rural resources was reinforced by dissatisfaction over bad inheritance and land

¹ Australia lost over 23,000 people by net emigration in the two years 1930-1.

² Hansen, M. L., "The Revolutions of 1848 and German Emigration," in *Journal of Economic and Business History*, August 1930. See also *International Migrations*, vol. ii, *passim*, for discussion of the causes operating in various countries.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

laws, an intolerant state church, a government slow to respond to popular demands, and compulsory military service. In Russia the Jew sought escape from his intolerable position as artisan or trader cooped up in town and village in the Pale, from restriction on his every act, and from pogroms ; the Gentile had insufficient land or had lost even what he once held. In short, a big slice of European emigration has been that of persons driven out by despair. Enough dust has been shaken from emigrant feet to silt up the Mersey, a fact which explains in part the rise of colonial claims for self-government and also the attitude of large sections of the American public towards Europe.

While much in Europe made men complain, there was little movement until the attractions of the new world were made known, until personal freedom to go or to stay was obtained, and until shipping and railroad services were at hand to mitigate the hazards, high costs, and discomforts of migration. How the new world made known what it had to offer is an interesting chapter in the history of publicity methods ; it ranged all the way from the letter of the successful immigrant to the ambitious campaigns of governments, railroads, shipping or colonizing companies, and to the occasionally shady representations of assemblers of labour gangs. Handbills and newspaper advertisements were widely used during the decade following Waterloo. In one issue of the *Leeds Mercury* (February 12, 1820) appears a half-column "Appeal to the Benevolent" for money to buy blankets for the starving poor. Immediately below it is an advertisement announcing that "Industrious Husbandmen have now an Opportunity for providing for themselves and acquiring in a Short Time Independence by cultivating Fertile Land in the Island of Prince Edward, a British Colony where there are no Taxes. The Land is situated on the banks of a Navigable River abounding with Fish, near the Sea, and fit for all Purposes of Agriculture, and those who are industrious cannot fail doing well." Bigge's reports on New South Wales and

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

Van Diemen's Land (1822-3), Wentworth's *Description of New South Wales* (1819), and the growing imports of Australian wool taught the English that Australia was more than "a gaol on a large scale," while the attractions of North America were the subject of countless books and press articles.

That the contented settler makes the best immigration agent is a truism the weight of which has recently been stressed by two Minnesota historians who have collected thousands of letters sent by Scandinavians in America to their folk in the old country. These "American letters" "fell like leaves from the land of Canaan. They were not only read and pondered by the simple and credulous individuals to whom they were addressed, and discussed in larger groups in homes and at markets and fairs and in crowds assembled at parish churches, but they were broadcast through the newspapers" and thus "infected parish after parish with the America fever." They gave thrilling accounts of cheap fertile land, of low taxes, of social equality, of religious freedom, of sobriety, and of the absence of children born out of wedlock. If there really was such a land, in which hogs were said to eat wild raisins and drink wine out of ditches, then it was better to be a pig in America than a human being in Sweden. The desire to emigrate grew intense and the "swarming of the Swedes" assumed the character of a mass migration, especially after the Civil War.¹

By that time the technique of large-scale invitation was being perfected by the railroads which had received land grants. The Illinois Central Railroad obtained 2,600,000 acres in 1851, and the policy thus inaugurated put 170,000,000 acres into the hands of American railways; it then migrated to Canada and won for the railroad builders of the Dominion gifts of about 47,000,000 acres. To dispose of its lands the Illinois Central inserted advertisements in

¹ Stephenson, G. M., "When America was the Land of Canaan," in *Minnesota History*, September 1929; also *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration* (Minneapolis, 1932). Also Blegen, T. C., *Norwegian Migration to America* (1931).

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

hundreds of newspapers and periodicals, scattered pamphlets printed in five languages, invited foreign travellers, journalists, and eminent public men to take free excursions through Illinois and write accounts of what they saw. Emigration agents were employed to work among the rural population at home and abroad; a land department was established, easy terms of purchase were offered, and settlers were given information and advice to help them in making the bald prairie habitable and productive.

These efforts to "sell" Illinois to settlers and speculators were copied and developed still further by governments and railroads throughout the western half of the country. Competition between states, and between railroads serving the same area, was at times intense, and the advertisers therefore ran poetic riot in describing their particular corner of Canaan.¹ When the lands of the American west had nearly all been distributed, Canada's chance came. To attract settlers she adopted the methods of her neighbour, and in 1896 began to subject the United States, the British Isles, and some parts of the continent to a heavy systematic bombardment. To American farmers whose land could now be sold at a good price, or whose western farms had proved to be bits of desert, Canada chanted the praises of her fertile prairies. To Canadians who had settled in the United States she offered fatted calves if the prodigals would return. No reader of an English newspaper could long remain ignorant of the fact that 160 acres were waiting for him in Canada, and the British housemaid was told of the high wages, comfortable quarters, and abundant half-days of leisure she could enjoy in Toronto or Winnipeg. Australia had less to offer, but she made what she had appear attractive. Mankind has probably never seen such bargain sales as were advertised by the new world in the sixty years which preceded the War.

¹ See Gates, P. W., "Land Policy of the Illinois Central Railroad," in *Journal of Economic and Business History*, August 1931; Petersen, H. F., "Early Minnesota Railroads and the Quest for Settlers," in *Minnesota History*, March 1932. Also "Some Colonization Projects of the Northern Pacific Railroad," in *Minnesota History*, June 1929.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

To-day the shops are nearly all closed ; there are no more bargains.

Of the goods which they had to offer, the most attractive were high wages and cheap or free land. The importance of the former has perhaps been underrated, and the influence of land as a magnet to migrants has been exaggerated. Even in the days of the "old immigration," when the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia supplied the bulk of the newcomers, only a small fraction came to take up land. Then, as later, much of the new settlement was done by natives or by men who had already lived many years in the new world. Of the immigrants, artisans went into industry ; Irish and German peasants, lacking industrial skill or capital, might have to take whatever employment offered itself, and "engaged, painfully to themselves and often wastefully to the employers, in all sorts of mechanical operations for which they (had) no traditional or acquired aptitude."¹ After the 'eighties the fraction which went into agriculture was still smaller, just at the time when the volume of migration was expanding rapidly and the national origins of the migrants were changing. It has often been said that the "new immigrants" from central, southern, and eastern Europe were clannish, stuck together in towns, and refused to face the trials of the western frontier. Yet what else could they do ? They had no capital with which to equip a farm ; but, more important still, there was little or no free or cheap land to which they could go. The date of arrival was almost as important as the point of departure, and even by 1900 it was apparent that immigrants were no longer contributing appreciably to the agricultural population. Thus American immigration reached its highest point not through the lure of land but through the demands of industry ; and the same is in some degree true of Canada and Australia.

Industrial development and high-tide immigration were,

¹ Francis A. Walker, statement made in 1870, quoted by Kirkland, E. C., *History of American Economic Life* (1932), p. 557.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

however, impossible until the land had been sufficiently occupied to feed the towns and provide a market for their products. To foster and at the same time control the occupation of huge areas of land of unknown quality called for statesmanship of a very high order and for ability to take long views into the dark or dawn. Rulers might formulate principles in London or Washington ; legislators might try to envisage the type of society that would best fit current political or social ideals and needs, and make plans to help the native and the new-comer in finding a home and a livelihood ; they might strive to foresee and checkmate all the tricks to which human ingenuity, perversity, or greed would lead the land-shark, the ne'er-do-well, the speculator, and even the comparatively honest settler. But the results rarely coincided with the effort, the precautions seldom prevented, the regulations never were watertight. Popular pressure from the frontier overrode metropolitan plans, and economic or geographical facts broke down political hopes. Accidents and discoveries destroyed the premises on which plans had been built, and difficulties or deficiencies in administration rendered the best laws ineffective. The gulf between aim and achievement was wide, and the best that can be said is that most countries learned the essentials of wise alienation by the time there was no land left to be alienated. It was a costly lesson, for the fee was the area capable of settlement in countries which contain one-fifth of the world's land surface, i.e. North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

The starting-point of any discussion of land policy was that empty land had no value ; it was a liability rather than an asset, a hiding-place for bad-tempered natives and outlaws, and a temptation to foreign powers. No sooner was the Napoleonic bogey laid than another took its place in British minds, and a parliamentary committee in 1816 urged that Australia be settled promptly in order to provide "a *point d'appui* against the encroachments of Russian aggrandize-

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

ment.”¹ Fear of French designs on Western Australia stimulated the ill-fated settlements at Albany and the Swan River, and interest in New Zealand was strengthened in part by the knowledge that a French occupation had been forestalled by only a few days or weeks. Occupied land brought security, defenders, producers, and tax-payers. Further, once settlement had begun the flow could not be stopped. If governments declared that land must not be used until a legal title of enjoyment had been granted, their citizens would laugh at them, go out and squat on the public lands, defy all “no trespassing” notices, build houses, cut down timber, and generally do as they wished. A Tasmanian governor might try to impound cattle found on crown land; a Washington office might order troops to evict or capture the “lawless horde” which was squatting on unsurveyed areas; a Sydney governor might denounce the owners of the flocks which grazed without permission on the plains beyond the Blue Mountains. But punishment and prevention were alike impossible: the pioneer was irrepressible, he abhorred a vacuum, he set the pace, and when he became politically powerful he dictated the terms on which the land should be handed to him.

Granted an abundance of public domain, the wisest policy, therefore, seemed to be that of giving a man enough land for a farm, provided he would settle on it and improve it. The American Homestead Act of 1862, copied by Canada in 1872, embodied this principle of conditional generosity; it was responsible for the transfer into private ownership of nearly 250,000,000 acres, or one-eighth of the total area of the United States, and of 60,000,000 acres of the Canadian prairies. Alongside it must be placed the gifts made as rewards, subsidies, or endowments. Ex-soldiers have always been offered land bounties, amounting in the United States to 68,000,000 acres; the United Empire Loyalists were given land in Canada as compensation and consolation for

¹ Quoted in the *Hobart Gazette*, April 5, 1817.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

their eviction from the United States after the Revolution; colonial judges, officials, bishops, and other dignitaries received land grants on or before their retirement, and a commission which examined Upper Canada in 1830 said that province had apparently "been considered by the government as a land fund to reward meritorious servants." As subsidy or endowment a land grant did not hurt the giver but might be of great value to the receiver. The clergy reserves in Canada amounted to over 3,000,000 acres in 1839. The ear-marking of one, two, or even four sections in each township¹ for schools, and various grants for high schools or colleges, provided a land endowment of about 150,000,000 acres for state education in the United States and at least 10,000,000 acres in Canada; and the subsidies to North American railroads included nearly 220,000,000 acres of land. The total extent of all this varied generosity cannot be accurately measured, but in the United States it amounted to at least 750,000,000 acres, or about half the total national domain.

The alternative to the land grant was the land sale. Need for money or experience of the unsatisfactory results of land grants led to land-selling; but whereas need made the United States begin as a land-seller and then change, under frontier pressure, to a policy of free grants, Australia began with grants but was soon converted by experience to a policy of land sales. Canada followed the same course, or rather the Colonial Office applied the same principles to both colonies; but when, in 1870, the Canadian government took over the prairies from the Hudson's Bay Company, it had to be at least as generous to settlers as was its neighbour, and therefore gave 25,000,000 acres to the Canadian Pacific Railroad and a free homestead to the settler who would live on it for part of three years instead of part of five as was the rule in the United States.

The results of the early free grants in Canada and Australia

¹ A section was a square mile, a township was 36 square miles.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

were seen by the eighteen-twenties to be unsatisfactory from every point of view. Little revenue was forthcoming ; the quit-rents which were to be paid by some grantees were not being paid ; promises to introduce settlers were not honoured, Loyalists and veterans were selling their land claims—sometimes for a gallon of rum or a few dollars—and speculators were building up large holdings of wild land. Real settlers were being compelled to penetrate far inland in search of a home, labourers went off to get a farm as soon as they had accumulated a few dollars, there was no money for public works, and settlement proceeded at a snail's pace over a scattered front which was hard to police.

British policy therefore changed in the 'twenties to one of land sales. The doctrines enunciated by Edward Gibbon Wakefield from 1829 onwards gave a pseudo-scientific approval to the new policy, for they showed that "systematic colonization" could be conducted only by charging a "sufficient price," i.e. sufficient to dissuade men from taking up too much land, sufficient to prevent labourers from getting a farm till they had worked long enough to save a substantial sum, and sufficient to provide money for public works, general administration, and an immigration fund. Wakefield's ideas dominated colonial policy for twenty years. They were inapplicable to the big grazing areas of the Australian "out-back," and there a system of leaseholds was adopted. They were unpopular in some quarters when self-government transferred control of the crown lands to colonial legislatures, and there was some giving away of land in two or three Australian states and parts of New Zealand. But in essentials the old policy was preserved ; the settler was welcomed, given liberal credit terms, and helped at a score of points by the state. But he must pay for his land eventually, and of the 180,000,000 acres of Australia which have been alienated or are in process of alienation probably less than 10,000,000 have been given away, while the billion

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

acres occupied under lease or licence are held subject to payment of rent.

The United States had many advocates of free land when it shaped its first land policy ; but the need for revenue with which to pay war debts and finance the infant government made land sales inevitable. As the debts disappeared and other sources of revenue were tapped, more generous impulses could prevail. The frontier demands for cheaper land must be taken into account by politicians, immigration must be encouraged, and land revenue must be cut down lest a bursting treasury lead to a reduction of the tariff. The price of land was dropped from a minimum of \$2 an acre to \$1.25 in 1820 ; squatters on the public domain were permitted after 1841 to pick a piece of land wherever they wished and buy it at the minimum price after a period of residence ; and in 1862 the cause of the " free soil " enthusiasts prevailed in the Homestead Act. Land continued to be sold ; homesteaders could get an additional 160 acres for \$200 ; they could purchase timber- or stone-bearing land, and in the arid areas land was sold for irrigation. But the total area alienated by sale from 1785 onwards was only about half that of the area given away. The quality was better, for much of it was east of the Mississippi, and on the prairies the free land was often so far from railroads that settlers found it more economical to buy railroad or school land than take up free homesteads. Hence even after 1862 not all new farms were made out of free land ; about 1,500,000 homesteads were eventually granted, and if we can assume that most of these became permanent farm units, they account for only about one-quarter of the total farms of the country. On the Canadian prairies about 620,000 homestead entries were filed during the years 1874-1924 ; but 285,000 of them were cancelled, thus giving point to the jest that the homesteader, when he paid his entry fee, bet the government \$10 against a quarter-section that he could " stick it " for three years.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

Granted the gift of hindsight, it is easy to deplore the short-sightedness, the over-rapid occupation, the opportunities for fraud and abuse, and the sufferings that attended the alienation of the public domain. Professor Hibbard, the leading student of American land policy, asserts that much of the recent depression in American agriculture is due to the haste with which the lands of the nation were brought into cultivation. "American farmers, in whose interests presumably the course was pursued, turned out to be its chief victims."¹ Until land could be classified on the basis of soil and climate the settler had to learn by experience whether he was safe or stranded, and as he moved beyond 100° W. Long. in North America or inland in Australia he entered regions of scanty or highly variable rainfall. To let men settle on lands of unknown quality, there to sink or swim, has proved a personally and socially costly form of trial and error, and to-day the United States government and some state authorities are faced with the task of removing people from 125,000,000 acres of "sub-marginal" land.

But if some settlers were deceived, others were deceivers, who violated or evaded the conditions attached to their tenures. Some took land as dummies for ranchers, lumber companies, or speculators, to whom they handed it over as soon as their title was clear. Some ignored the residence and improvement clauses of the contract ; if they had promised to plant trees, irrigate acres, or use timber only for their own personal needs, they often failed to keep their word, and there was no adequate staff of inspectors to detect breaches of law or contract. Land policy was one-tenth legislation and nine-tenths administration, yet the administrative machinery in nearly every country was hopelessly inadequate and the domain was therefore at the mercy of every frontier variety of original sin. Even legislation lagged behind the

¹ Hibbard, B. H., *A History of the Public Land Policies* (N.Y., 1924), contains the best critical survey of the American story. See also Hibbard's article on "Land Grants" in the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, ix, 36.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

needs of the situation. On the one hand, land-seekers demanded more and more plunder or aid ; on the other hand, the officials suggested how a defect here or an obstacle there could be removed, but decades might pass before the law was amended.¹ In general, Australia made the best job of its land policy, but even there the laws which were planned to help small farmers and hit big sheep squatters discharged their shot from the wrong end of the blunderbuss and strengthened the squatter's grasp on his holding. In Canada much settlement was made on unsuitable land, and inexperienced new-comers picked land without expert guidance. In the United States classification and conservation became recognized needs only when there was little left to classify or conserve.

To-day the flow to the empty lands of Greater Europe has virtually ended. The urge is still there, as is evident from the invasion of the Peace River Country, north of Edmonton. Much of that region is north of 55° N. Lat., yet the report that life is bearable and farming possible has acted like a magnet, and the population has grown from less than 2,000 in 1911, and 20,000 in 1921, to over 60,000 in 1931. But the fuss over the Peace River is a measure of the anxiety with which the new world scours its horizon for new frontier patches. The public domain of the United States has only 170,000,000 acres—mostly desert—left vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved. Some of the states have land, and are adding to the supply : but the additions consist of farms which are falling into public possession because of tax delinquency, while the plight of some who are still struggling on poor land is so tragic that plans are being made to take these settlers off to some less infertile spot. In Canada the field for further settlement is limited to the Peace River, to odd fragments scattered over the prairies, and to the northern

¹ The Homestead Act unit of 160 acres was hopelessly inadequate for the semi-arid areas of the west ; but Congress did not recognize this till 1904, and then arbitrarily fixed 320 or 640 acres. Yet even such a unit was a death-trap in some regions. Irrigation was first touched in 1877, but no real plan was devised till 1902.

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

fringe of the wheat belt—provided wheat varieties can be found which will mature in the short frost-free period of that fringe. The Dominion government has handed over to the prairie provinces what is left of the public domain inside their boundaries. It still holds 1,500,000 square miles, but nearly all of it is beyond 60° N. Lat. and fit only for Indians, Eskimos, reindeer, or sparse grazing. When returned soldiers were offered aid if they cared to become farmers, only one-fifth of those who accepted the offer could be provided with land out of the domain ; for the remainder, land had to be bought from private owners. The provinces have considerable areas, but little on which the old kind of settlement is possible, and it is significant that they have all, with one exception, abandoned the free homestead policy. In Australia 40 per cent. of the continent is “ occupied by the crown or unoccupied ” and is unoccupiable ; some war veterans were provided with crown land, but for most of them land had to be bought at a cost of nearly £30,000,000 for 22,000 farms. The empty one-third of New Zealand cannot be occupied ; South Africa, never a strong magnet to the migrant, has small land resources to offer ; in Siberia the best lands are nearly all in farmers’ hands, and in the Argentine the cattleman and grain-grower are in occupation of most of the areas capable of settlement.

What, then, of the future ? The door has been nearly closed on extensive immigration of industrial workers, and will probably never again swing wide open. The day when pioneering rested mainly on a supply of cheap fertile land is ended, and settlement henceforth requires a considerable sum of money in the pocket of the new farmer and a substantial outlay of public funds in buying back land, in building roads or railroads, or in providing water supplies, schools, medical aid, and other things which modern settlers are coming to regard as necessities.

Settlement by men possessed of a comparatively large sum of capital is no new thing. Not all the land-seekers of the

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

nineteenth century were penniless or poor, for the attractions of life on a large country estate in the new world took many younger members of the European middle and "lower upper" classes overseas. One Ontario community in the eighteen-thirties consisted of six settlers, of whom four had "been to a university, one at the military college at Woolwich, and the sixth, though boasting no such honours, (had) half a dozen silver spoons and a wife who (played) the guitar." Some early Australian sheep-stations were founded by men of moderate means, and some of the great cattle ranches of Wyoming were established by Britons who at least once a year rode into Cheyenne, donned evening suits, and went to listen to an operatic prima donna brought out from New York for the occasion. Further, while multitudes of poor took up free land, many others went to the frontier with savings or with cash obtained from the sale of farms farther east, and this money they used to equip a free homestead or to buy better land from the government, the railroad, or the land company. The million Americans who entered the Canadian prairies between 1900 and 1914 brought not merely a knowledge of prairie farming but also a great amount of capital as well. In one year (1909) they carried in \$60,000,000 in stock, cash, and settlers' effects. Half of them homesteaded, the remainder bought land or improved farms. Still, it remains true that much settlement was done by men who were rich in ability and willingness to work, but poor in this world's goods.

To-day such settlement is very hard. In the Peace River country wild land has sold at \$20-\$60 an acre. The Rhodesian settler is advised to have £1,500 to £2,500 when he arrives. The C.P.R. offers its aid to the man with a family, some experience, and at least £500. Handbooks issued by the Overseas Settlement Department in 1923 warned those who thought of going to South Africa that they should not start farming there with less than £2,000 capital if they were married and £1,500 if they were single. If they

MIGRATION AND CHEAP LAND

went to New Zealand, from £100 to £500 of working capital was required to "make a comfortable livelihood on small holdings," but this sum would not include the purchase of the land. The loans which helped Canadian soldiers to buy, improve, and equip their farms averaged £800 each; the land repurchased for Australian soldiers cost over £1,300 per farm. Thus, unless governments or railroads are willing to advance the greater part of the money needed for repurchase of land, equipment, and working capital, migration for settlement in the new world is destined to be a trickle of the rural or urban middle class.¹

But such state-stimulated settlement would be a triumph of hope over experience. Some areas *might* be settled or more closely settled if transport facilities were improved, if irrigation defied the low rainfall, if a disciplined group was planted in an area where an individual could do little, and if the commodities which were produced could find a profitable market. Such plans would involve a concerted attack rather than a piecemeal settlement, with active governmental preparation and participation. But there is already abundant evidence to show the dangers and limits of such colonization. New South Wales once found that a grandiose scheme for settling 6,000 new farmers would cost £20,000,000. Western Australia's much-advertised group settlements in the timber belt cost £9,000,000 and housed 1,700 settlers, whose farms had cost more to carve out than they were worth and whose efforts had made two ears of wheat grow where one giant tree grew before. The irrigation projects on the River Murray and in the American desert have loaded the producer with heavy overhead costs, watered a soil that was not always worth attention, or stimulated the production of commodities which could not be sold at a profit in competition with the produce of other regions. The planning and

¹ For a discussion of the whole problem of settlement to-day see Bowman, I., "The Pioneer Fringe," and Joerg, W. L. G., "Pioneer Settlement: Co-operative Studies by 26 Authors" (*Am. Geog. Soc., Special Publications* 13 and 14, 1931, 1932).

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

preparation of such new communities is as fascinating as the schemes of Owen or Fourier ; the results have frequently been as tragic.

If this pessimistic analysis of the situation is correct, one of the greatest movements in European history seems to be drawing to a close. Chapter I saw the Germanic peoples go south and west ; in Chapter II Rhinelanders and Dutchmen moved east over the Slav lands to the Vistula and beyond. The third chapter saw the pioneers establish a foothold in the Americas, the fourth witnessed the mass movements across the Atlantic and across the Equator. Will there be a fifth chapter, or will the edge of the Arctic and of the desert prove an effective barrier ? The barrier has been broken at times by the dry farmer, the engineer, and the producer of new grain varieties ; but advance has become increasingly hazardous, and the opportunities for still further movement seem few and small. The task now is to cultivate more intensively what is already occupied. Man must stay where he is.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

By H. GOLDHAMER

I

THE psychological analysis of war and certain of its concomitant phenomena does not involve the creation of a special psychology—"the psychology of war." One must either apply the available body of psychological knowledge and method or else refrain from meddling with these questions by the *ad hoc* invention of specially devised doctrines and terminologies. Until there is valid reason for believing that war brings into play unique mental mechanisms or behaviour processes it must be dealt with in much the same manner as any other series of data susceptible to psychological analysis.

This implies that the phenomena of war are of no special importance to the theoretical psychologist except, perhaps, for the fact that some forms of behaviour find in them a more striking exemplification. This, however, is not to infer that war phenomena can be analyzed psychologically on the basis of the general principles of the science alone and without special studies of individuals and nations in war situations. In most cases the embarrassment of the psychologist in dealing with war is simply due to the fact that special investigations are required that he has had no occasion or opportunity to undertake. Obviously war situations give rise to a great number of psychological problems. These might easily include such diverse material as the development of psychoses among combatants, questions of authority and discipline in armies, or the comparative intelligence of the various departments of the war service. The psychological analysis of war, however, involves much broader and socially more vital problems and it is with these that we are here concerned, namely those problems that issue from the question "Why

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

war?" Faced with this question psychologists have tended to divide into two camps. On the one hand are those who centre their analysis on the original endowment of man, on the other those who interpret behaviour as the subjective aspect of the cultural milieu. The former speak largely in terms of instincts, impulses and primal urges, the latter in terms of social attitudes. The present paper analyzes the major variants of the instinctivist or hormic approach to the problem of war, outlines the social-psychological interpretation of the same problem and attempts to estimate which of these two approaches is the more fruitful and the degree to which they supplement each other.

II

The application of the instinctivist approach to war will be placed in a clearer light if first it is recognized that instinct is not a reservoir of mysterious forces impelling individuals to action. The instinct is the action together with any cognitive, conative or affective elements that may originally belong to the action pattern. Instinctive activity is differentiated from other action patterns (1) because it is unlearned and dependent upon the hereditary structural characteristics of the organism and (2) because of its initial specificity in regard to both the stimulus and the response. During the course of life much of this specificity, especially that of the stimulus, is lost, a variety of stimuli now serving to evoke the original response. The response, on the other hand, may also become modified in the acquisition of effective adjustments to the physical and social world. Thus the total organic response that we call anger may not only be induced by physical restraint, its original stimulus, but by many other stimuli as well; likewise the response may undergo many transformations, relatively slight in its visceral, but well marked in its skeletal components. Consequently, after very early life, unless one confines observations to the chain reflexes, relatively few instances of purely instinctive behaviour can be

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

discovered. That is to say that in mature life little of an individual's behaviour is the necessary biological result of his hereditary organic structure or the stimuli to which he is subjected.

In popular analyses of war nothing has contributed more to loose thinking than the tendency to consider war behaviour as a single, homogeneous, instinctive action of the individual. Psychological analysis on this basis is obviously impossible. The behaviour patterns involved in warfare are numerous ; they are historically conditioned ; at each epoch they differ. When it is said that war behaviour is "instinctive" does this then mean that these forms of behaviour are organically determined ? Is the firing of a rifle instinctive ? No one, of course, would affirm such a proposition, yet it may be pointed out that essentially this belief is often subscribed to, though it disguises itself by dealing with war behaviour as a unitary reaction of the organism.

The argument, however, usually takes another form. In this case war is no longer regarded as an instinctive type of activity in itself, but rather as being the expression of a more specific instinct. As was pointed out above the initial instinctive action patterns become modified in the process of adjustment, especially in acquiring conformity to social norms. If, then, we assume for a moment the existence of some form of instinctive conflict behaviour, it may seem quite reasonable to suppose that war may be a social or institutional modification of the original instinctive action pattern. McDougall presents this type of argument.

"The instinct of pugnacity has played a part second to none in the evolution of social organization, and in the present age it operates more powerfully than any other in producing demonstrations of collective emotion and action on a great scale. . . . But its modes of expression have changed with the growth of civilization ; as the development of law and custom discourages and renders unnecessary the bodily combat of individuals, this gives place to the collective

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

combat of communities and to the more refined forms of combat within communities. . . .

"The replacement of individual by collective pugnacity is most clearly illustrated by barbarous peoples living in small, strongly organized communities. Within such communities individual combat and even expressions of personal anger may be almost completely suppressed, while the pugnacious instinct finds its vent in perpetual warfare between communities, whose relations remain subject to no law. . . . The history of Christendom is largely the history of devastating wars from which few individuals or societies have reaped any immediate benefit, and in the causation of which the instinct of pugnacity of the rulers, or of the masses of the peoples, has played a leading part. In our own age the same instinct makes of Europe an armed camp occupied by twelve million soldiers. . . ."¹

It is unnecessary here to offer a critique of McDougall's general theory of the instincts, but we may recall, first, his emphasis on the purposive and conative aspect of instinct, and secondly, his ascription of a specific emotion to each instinct, the emotion being interpreted as the affective component of the instinctive activity. In the case of pugnacity the accompanying emotion is anger. Further, we may note that McDougall recognizes that prior to social modification instincts present a certain specificity both in their action patterns and in the stimuli effective in educing them. In discussing the modification of the instinct of pugnacity he speaks of certain original or natural bodily movements which later undergo changes and also of the substitution of new stimuli for those that are provided for in the innate disposition.² Elsewhere, however, he writes :

"It [the instinct of pugnacity] occupies a peculiar position in relation to the other instincts, and cannot strictly be brought under the definition of instinct proposed in the first chapter. For it has no specific object or objects the perception of which

¹ William McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1928, pp. 240-241.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 30-36.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

constitutes the initial stage of the instinctive process. The condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts. And its impulse is to break down any such obstruction and to destroy whatever offers this opposition. This instinct thus presupposes the others ; its excitement is dependent upon, or secondary to, the excitement of the others, and is apt to be intense in proportion to the strength of the obstructed impulse.”¹

Assuming for a moment the validity of McDougall's account of the instinct of pugnacity, it is not easy to see its applicability to war phenomena ; for it would be difficult to contend that when masses of people take up arms they do so because of an obstruction by the foe of the free exercise of their impulses and instincts. Only by an unwarranted extension of terms could one consider that international economic rivalry, for example, constitutes an obstruction of the individual's instincts. However, it is apparent enough if one closely examines McDougall's thesis that the major difficulty lies in the attempt to treat the emotional response of anger as the affective aspect of pugnacity. In the case of anger we are already dealing with an instinctive form of behaviour ; the two terms are by no means exclusive. When the emotional response is induced in an infant we find a fairly constant form of visceral reaction together with rather diffuse and unorganized skeletal responses. As the infant grows the visceral reactions remain relatively unchanged, but the skeletal responses rapidly become adapted to the exterior situation. It follows that the so-called instinct of pugnacity is merely the overt reaction of an organism undergoing an emotional response. It is the latter which is the truly instinctive form of behaviour. The overt response in mature life is a learned adaptive response and differs according to the external situation.

¹ William McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1928, p. 51.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

It is interesting to observe that in his little book *Janus* McDougall shifts his argument somewhat and approaches a position which from the point of view of the type of analysis employed is more similar to the above. He writes :

"Allied to the good people who attribute all war to the wickedness of the goats, are those who bring a more general indictment against human nature and find a sufficient explanation of all war in the fact that man is a pugnacious beast, that the human species is endowed with an instinct of pugnacity. They are apt to take a fatalistic line and to assert with resignation that this fact of natural history renders it useless to try to prevent war. Or, if they are less resigned, they join with the 'pacifists' proper in hoping to prevent war by exhortation, by education, by more intensive preaching of the principles of Christianity. Many of them assert that war is due to hate, the hate of one nation for another. These seem commonly to assume that hate springs unbidden in the human breast. They neglect to inquire into the nature and causes of hatred. If they should so inquire, they would find that hatred is always a blend of anger and fear, that both the anger and the fear have their grounds, and that the fear of international hate is *the fear of aggression*."¹

Here war is no longer considered the expression of an instinct of pugnacity, but rather an institutionalized response in a specific emotional situation. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in this statement, but it by no means does justice to the complexity of actual war motivations. However, the implications of this position will be considered more fully later.

It would be unnecessary duplication to consider numerous other writers who have sought to account for war largely on the basis of a fighting instinct. But the recent application of the psycho-analytic theory of instincts to the phenomena of war² requires quite separate treatment, psycho-analytic

¹ William McDougall, *Janus : The Conquest of War*, 1927, pp. 37-38.

² Edward Glover, *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, 1933. See also the published correspondence between Einstein and Freud, *Why War ?*, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1933.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

doctrine and terminology being on the whole too divergent from the "accepted" body of psychological theory to be considered alongside with it.

"The first systematic step in investigating the relations of war and peace," writes Dr. Glover, "is to make a list of the instincts or impulses concerned."¹ In accordance with psycho-analytic theory Dr. Glover names the sexual or Life instinct and the destructive or Death instinct as the two primal impulses of man. As a development of the primitive destructive impulse a stage of development occurs in all individuals in which the infliction of some sort of pain becomes an aim in itself. Destructive impulses, however, rarely express themselves in isolation. The fusion of destructive and love impulses is termed sadism when it is directed towards external objects and masochism when directed towards the self. Due to a process of repression these powerful impulses rarely rise to the focus of consciousness. Repression, nevertheless, is often faulty. "The phenomena of war-mongering," writes Dr. Glover, "provide an apt illustration of the dangers and uncertainties of faulty repression. . . . And in the ordinary way preoccupation with international rights and wrongs is a useful substitute activity, a vicarious discharge of emotional tension, the original source of which is infantile sadism. *During actual crises, however, this vicarious discharge may bias the person towards war or peace.*"² Since the instinctual enemy (the impulses) is internal and unknown a projection or psychic displacement takes place which attempts "to convert an inner (psychic) stimulus into an outer (reality) stimulus, an inner enemy into an outer enemy."³ This mechanism, however, does not effectively control the primal impulses. "*In the face of the instinctual impasse the psychic apparatus grows a new organ. . . . Both the primitive loves and primitive hates [of the infant] are of their nature destined to perpetual frustration. . . . The friendly modellings absorb hopeless love and sinister modellings employ hopeless hate in a useful way. Hate-energy*

¹ Edward Glover, *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, 1933, p. 14. ² *Ibid.*, p. 24. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

is to a large extent used up in self-scrutiny and inhibition. In short these identifications are built into a new mental system, part of which exercises an aggressive function. It scrutinizes impulse with severity and ends by inhibiting or thwarting from within almost all primitive instinct. *The energy used for this purpose is the individual's primal sadism now intuned.* In other words, this new psychic organ or scrutinizing system (sometimes called the Super-ego or Primitive Unconscious Conscience) uses up a large part though not all of the thwarted aggression."¹

It is the development of this new organ that explains the meaning of an early statement by Glover: "*A large part of the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose war,*"² and also the statement already quoted, "*During actual crises, however, this vicarious discharge may bias the person towards war or peace.*" The explanation lies in the struggle between the primitive ego which says "slay your enemies" and the unconscious mentor (or Super-ego) which says, "if you slay them, I will slay you." Whether, then, in any situation an individual shows militarist or pacifist tendencies will apparently depend on whether the balance of power lies with the primitive ego or the unconscious mentor. The way out that Dr. Glover offers is: "Take care of your own aggression and the aggression of nations will take care of itself. . . . *Know thine own (unconscious) sadism.*"³

In a second essay Dr. Glover supplements his discussion of sadism with a consideration of masochistic tendencies. It is unnecessary to consider this in detail. Dr. Glover is here concerned in pointing out that masochism with its tendency to value or at least tolerate injury and humiliation must also be recognized as favouring war or at least producing an indifferent attitude towards it. In a third essay he discusses the possibility of environmental alterations in the child's life that would alleviate his anxiety and aid him in his internal

¹ Edward Glover, *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, 1933, pp. 30 ff. ² *Ibid.*, p. 13. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

conflict. He adds, however, "that the only radical approach to the most primitive phases is a prolonged individual analytical approach."¹

Dr. Glover's thesis rests largely on the assumption of a destructive instinct. In this he follows Freud in the latter's discussion of the two classes of instincts.² Healy summarizes Freud's position as follows: "He thinks the term should be reserved for primal trends only, that is, for those which cannot be resolved further. In addition, 'instinct' connotes for Freud a constant psychic force attacking from within the organism, having its source in important somatic processes and needs in various organs or parts of the body. These inner psychic stimuli are always seeking to create situations which will secure for them various specific forms of motor discharge, or activity in respect to an object, thus bringing about an easing or slackening of the stimulus-tension. Complete instinct gratification (motor activity) can only be achieved through contact with the outer world."³ This definition is quite clear enough, but the application by psycho-analytic theorists of the concept of instinct has in general been very loose and indiscriminating, the definition itself offering little inhibition to a tendency towards speculative rashness. In the case of the Eros or sexual instinct the somatic basis can be traced to the glandular apparatus and sensitive zone regions of the organism. One might well ask, however, what "important somatic processes" and what "needs in various organs or parts of the body" can be indicated as providing a somatic basis for the destructive impulse. It seems that one must look in vain for an organic foundation that would account for tendencies toward the reinstatement of an earlier level of personality development, self-immolating impulses and aggressive impulses toward objects, all of which tendencies comprise according to Freud

¹ Edward Glover, *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, 1933, p. 105.

² Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, 1927, ch. iv.

³ Healy, Bronner and Bower, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, 1931, p. 68.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

the general forms in which the destructive instinct expresses itself. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that psychoanalysts like Schilder consider the existence of a destructive instinct questionable, and that Jones writes that Freud's conceptions of instinct "do not at present form an essential part of psychoanalytic theory."¹

One has, however, by no means disposed of Dr. Glover's thesis even by discarding one of his most vital concepts. Sadism still calls for recognition; the mere rejection of an explanation in instinctual terms can hardly be taken to mean that this form of behaviour is of no consequence. The fact, however, that it is no longer identified with vague, imperious urges or with "primal" impulses should restrain the unqualified extension of this concept as an explanatory principle for the most diverse forms of behaviour.

The question with which we are really faced here is the correlation or compatibility that exists between various forms of personality integration and war activity. Two factors have to be taken into consideration. First, sadistic tendencies vary enormously in their degree of strength, and the existence of such tendencies strong enough to form an "unconscious justification of war" has never been demonstrated as holding true for the general run of people. To quote obvious cases of sadism and masochism occurring in war time is not even presumptive evidence that this was the unconscious motivation that led several million men to take up arms in the World War. Further, even in those cases in which sadism was most clearly exhibited it is a matter of debate to what extent latent sadism found in the crisis of a war situation an outlet for expression, and to what extent it actually helped to determine in the first instance, even unconsciously, the entrance into that situation. This is an important distinction, the distinction between a psychological mechanism occurring in a war situation and the ascription of the war situation to the mechanism itself. The second point follows from the

¹ Healy, Bronner and Bower, *ibid.*, p. 73.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

concept of personality integration. The appeal to instinct offering only a basis for behaviour and not an account or explanation of behaviour itself, we are ultimately forced to attempt the more difficult but more worthwhile effort to understand war behaviour in terms of the complex integration of those numerous traits conceptualized by such terms as disposition, temperament, character, attitudes and sentiments. To select any single component such as sadism is to misunderstand the nature of social behaviour, unless, of course, proof were forthcoming (which certainly does not exist now) that it possessed a pre-emptive conational drive. We have seen, however, that Glover himself stresses that the primal impulses of which he speaks do not directly lead to aggressive behaviour. To repeat a passage already quoted, "*A large part of the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose war.*" Where, then, are we to look for the differential factors that determine the direction of that energy? Dr. Glover fails singularly in this, the most critical point of his essay. It is clear, however, that the concept of the Super-ego, or the unconscious mentor, is largely appealed to in this connection. Conscience as the layman understands the term is merely the conscious and less important aspect of the Super-ego. If one scrutinizes the content of the Super-ego one will find that it takes its genesis from the *mores* of the family and the larger social groups. One will find, further, that the Super-ego changes as the child grows to adolescence and from adolescence to maturity. The concepts of identification and introjection so largely used by psycho-analysts in connection with the Super-ego have clear reference to its social conditioning. It appears, then, that even were we to follow Dr. Glover we should have to look for the differential factors determining the tendencies towards militarism or pacifism in the functioning of the Super-ego, that is in the nature of the individual's social life, in his attitudes, sentiments and ideals.

However, although the analysis of aggressive behaviour

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

based on an original destructive energy and on primal sadistic impulses is here rejected, there is no intention of denying that repressions and intra-psychic conflicts derived from less esoteric sources often lead to aggressive and asocial behaviour. This is an undoubted psychological truth. But from this one cannot infer, as one conceivably might from an original destructive instinct, that war is simply the externalisation and dissolution of psychic conflicts and repressions. War may undoubtedly serve this end and thus increase an individual's receptivity to it. But there is no evidence that would suggest that this factor is either a primary or a necessary condition for the mobilization of people for war purposes.

Finally, we may note briefly the desire for novelty and change as a form of restiveness that may easily lead some individuals to accept war as a relief from the mediocrity of everyday existence in which life, reduced to the level of habitual action, leaves little room for the expansion of energy and initiative.¹

III

From the consideration of man's native endowment we turn to the discussion of what may in general be termed the organization of attitudes. In *Janus* McDougall has emphasized the emotional basis of war, especially the emotion of hate which is a combination of fear and anger. It seems obvious, however, that emotion in the psychological sense scarcely ever maintains a constancy of expression and fixity of purpose sufficient to account for the vast, impersonal and lengthy organization of war behaviour. Further, it is highly doubtful whether in the civilian population hate as a pure emotion, with the enemy as its object, ever existed to any great extent. Among the actual combatants it found little expression, as one can easily observe from the memoirs and

¹ In this connexion see William James's well-known essays, "The Moral Equivalent of War" and "Energies of Man" in his *Memories and Studies*, 1911.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

anecdotes of war periods.¹ What we are really dealing with here are relatively fixed attitudes and sentiments, or newly formed attitudes induced by propaganda. The attitudes, to be sure, almost always subsist within a strong affective aura, but to stress this affective aspect without considering the origin, multiplicity and organization of attitudes is to oversimplify the problem of analysis.

War is an institution ; that is to say, it is a relatively formal and stable type of collective endeavour or social organization. Like most other institutions it possesses an administrative hierarchy and elaborate rituals and codes of behaviour. We are accustomed to look upon institutions as collective forms of adjustment, and here we note that war, unlike law for instance, is not a continuous phenomenon. This, however, is largely due to the fact that we usually speak of a nation or a state as a whole entering into war at specific intervals. Nevertheless, war as an institution may also be said to possess a continuous aspect, and this we find in the permanent organization of a military hierarchy.

Basic to any form of institutional behaviour is a system of loyalties and ideals. In the case of war these ideals may either be centred about the nation or state and thus be exploited when the nation faces a war situation, or they may in addition be centred about warfare itself as an ideal form of behaviour. These two aspects, however, usually function together, although one can discover at times instances in which the idealization of warfare is relatively independent of group loyalties. In modern Occidental history there is perhaps no nation in which the idealization of the warrior and of conflict reached such proportions as in Germany. One cannot here fall back on any facile interpretation in terms of racial or national characteristics. The social values of any group

¹ " True it is that indignation has swept over the country, a wave of anger aroused by alleged offences to national honour, or by some other cause ; but it is a far cry from this abstract and ' public ' sort of anger to that personal hatred which is necessary to induce one man to go out and kill another. We acquiesce in the war before we are ready to kill."—F. H. Allport, *Institutional Behaviour*, 1933, p. 150.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

require explanation in social-psychological and sociological terms. The source and development of the social evaluation of the military life in Germany can be traced to its political and economic development. Germany's late emergence from the conditions of a feudal caste society, the struggle for unification, and finally its geographic and political relations to other countries rendered the Prussian (and later the German) army of paramount importance. Consequently the army officer was accorded privileges and social status that few could rival, but many envied. With the growth of economic power the upper bourgeoisie penetrated into the officer corps which originally had been a closed aristocratic group. This increased the circle of participation but without endangering the social prestige of the officer caste. A reverential attitude toward the military profession became widespread and was sedulously fostered by those who attached the utmost importance to the position of the army in Germany's historical development.¹ We may note, moreover, that the social and educational system of Germany was particularly well adapted for the application to social action of the dominant ideas of political and philosophical élite groups. The belief that philosophical ideas and ideals can, when socially transmitted, aid in shaping collective attitudes can by no means be ignored. Heine has formulated this conception in striking and, if we consider present-day Germany, almost prophetic words :

"It seems to me that a methodical people, such as we, must begin with the reformation, must then occupy ourselves with systems of philosophy, and only after their completion pass to the political revolution. . . . Then will appear Kantians, as little tolerant of piety in the world of deeds as in the world of ideas, who will mercilessly upturn with sword and axe the soil of our European life to extirpate the last remnants of the past. Then will come upon the scene armed Fichteans, whose fanaticism of will is to be restrained neither

¹ For the development of the officer corps in Germany see Karl Demeter, *Das Deutsche Offizierkorps in seinen historisch-soziologischen Grundlagen*, 1930.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

by fear nor self-interest, for they live in the spirit. . . . Most of all to be feared would be the philosophers of nature, were they actively to mingle. . . . For if the hand of the Kantian strikes with strong unerring blow ; if the Fichtean courageously defies every danger, since for him danger has in reality no existence ;—the Philosopher of Nature will be terrible in that he has allied himself with the primitive powers of nature, in that he can conjure up the demoniac forces of old German pantheism ; and having done so, aroused in him that ancient Germanic eagerness which combats for the joy of the combat itself. . . . Smile not at my counsel as at the counsel of a dreamer. . . . The thought precedes the deed as the lightning the thunder. . . . The hour will come. As on the steps of an amphitheatre, the nations will group themselves around Germany to witness the terrible combat.”¹

But institutions and ideals are also subject to the process of competition. Peace, von Moltke has said, is a dream and not even a beautiful dream. Nevertheless, international peace as an important social ideal has always had its sponsors and especially since the World War there has been a marked tendency to institutionalize the peace movement, so that one may now with some justification speak not only of war, but also of peace as an institution. One need not be entirely sceptical about the efficacy of such peace ideals. Their major weakness lies in the curious but important fact that they possess no social sanction ; their institutional basis remains inadequate. Where, as in the case of the Quakers, peace ideals have received the support of strong sanctions their partial efficacy cannot be denied. The very existence of the Quakers as a separate sect is dependent upon the maintenance of those special characteristics of their religious and social outlook which serve to demarcate them from others. Pacifism, therefore, does not remain an unattached and impotent ethical ideal, but is of necessity firmly embedded in the institutional structure of the Quakers. Similarly, one may observe that the pacifism of the members of the Second Inter-

¹ Quoted from John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 1915, pp. 84-85.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

national and the Zimmerwald conference derived its strength, not from considerations of "humanity," but from the fact that war was identified as a subsidiary institution of capitalism and was thus opposed to their own concrete institutional aims.

The problem of war, however, is by no means merely a question of attitudes towards war and peace. There still remain as important factors the loyalties and ideals that cluster about the notion of the state and nation. These, given the proper stimulus and leadership, easily express themselves in war activity even though war itself is not set up by the group as one of the social values. The individual is taught to think in terms of the *national* honour, *national* will and *national* good. The attempt to resolve these abstractions into the honour, will and good of the separate individuals or special groups composing the nation is generally discouraged. With the aid of emotionally charged symbols people are easily led to act on behalf of a "national interest" which may in actuality be nobody's interest or the interest of only a small group. Sumner¹ has written a much-quoted account of the manner in which sentiments of loyalty and contempt are built up in the individual in relation to the in-group and the out-group respectively. It is unnecessary here to trace the development of this ethnocentrism as Sumner terms it. But one important modification is required. Sumner's classic analysis was largely based on the study of primitive groups in which the homogeneity of the in-group and the latter's differentiation from the out-group are usually well marked. Further, interaction between the in- and out-groups is in these cases much restricted. In modern societies, on the other hand, both internal homogeneity and international differentiation and isolation have been decidedly weakened. The result is that in national emergencies the ethnocentrism of modern societies constantly requires to be reinforced by the special techniques of propaganda.²

¹ W. G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, 1906, pp. 12 ff.

² For an excellent account of war-time propaganda see H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, 1927.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

Unfortunately scientific study has scarcely begun in this field.¹ The opinion of a politician who is a competent observer may, however, be of some value. McDougall summarizes the views of a former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as follows :

" Mr. Arthur Ponsonby . . . places the responsibility for war on what he calls ' Authority.' And by ' Authority ' he means the influence of the holders of official and semi-official positions in the nation, those who, largely by reason of their well-recognized positions, are the main supporters of the customary and traditional attitudes in public affairs, and who in the main lead and form public opinion on all questions concerning the life of the nation. He does not charge these persons with sheer delight in warfare, with a special dose of original sin or anything of that sort. He regards them rather as led into the support of war and of preparations for war, and especially into maintaining and cultivating in the people at large a mental and moral readiness for war, by the momentum of the traditions within which they are brought up, traditions to whose influence they are peculiarly susceptible in virtue of their positions within the hierarchy of officialdom. The influence of traditional ways of thinking and feeling (especially the traditional belief that war must inevitably recur) upon many of these persons is re-enforced by self-interest, as in the case of the soldier whose career is made one of quicker advancement, of more vivid interest and of greater consideration, by wars and rumours of war. Although, then, deliberate self-seeking and malignity may play but a minor part in the whole working of Authority, Mr. Ponsonby charges it with maintaining perennially ' The Great Conspiracy,' by which he means a more or less concerted effort to keep public opinion tuned up for war, an effort which takes the form of exaltation on all occasions of the military function, its heroism, its glamour, its services to the nation in the past, its indispensability in the future."²

The extent to which the administration is itself subject to the pressure of economic interests or is identified with them

¹ See, however, the pioneer work by H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 1932.

² William McDougall, *Janus*, 1927, pp. 36-37.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

would also have to be considered in this connexion. This, however, is more a matter of the relations existing between the economic and political structures and cannot be dealt with here. Of major importance, however, is the power possessed by political and economic leaders to shape collective attitudes by means of such media as the school, press, radio and cinema. It is this fact that renders the psychological analysis of political and economic élite groups one of the most significant problems for future investigation.¹

IV

One requires no elaborate analysis or further enumeration of the social-psychological data outlined above to recognize their importance for psychological investigations of war. Nevertheless, in view of the claims of the hormic psychologists (including here the psycho-analysts) it is necessary to determine in what manner these facts are related to the native propensities of man.

The hormic psychologists, particularly McDougall, have been severely criticized for their application of the theory of instincts to many behaviour forms that are socially conditioned. Yet it would be unwise to suppose that the hormic psychologists ignore the social factor in behaviour. "To the hormic psychologist . . . instinct is essentially modifiable, differing in this respect from the reflex, and it seems justifiable and useful to trace the developments of behaviour in terms of *variations in expression of the same fundamental urge*."² If the nature of the fundamental urges are first clarified by accurate analysis the hormic approach is capable of providing a broad basis for the understanding of human behaviour. Thus, in the case of war one is finally driven back to inborn affective

¹ In this connexion studies of the social composition of élite groups constitute a first step. For the political group in England see Harold J. Laski, *The British Cabinet: A Study of its Personnel, 1801-1924*, Fabian Tract No. 223, 1928; and Robert T. Nightingale, *The Personnel of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 1851-1929*, Fabian Tract No. 232, 1930.

² J. C. Flugel, *A Hundred Years of Psychology*, 1933, p. 275.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR

potentialities in order to account for the possibility of building up in man a complex hierarchy of loyalties, sentiments and emotionally tinged attitudes. This, however, would not take one very far in a psychological investigation of war, for the affective equipment of men is equally basic to most forms of behaviour. The very generality of the hormic factors forces the investigator to seek in social processes and social structures the differential factors determining the course of the particular form of behaviour in which he is interested. Both the hormic and the social factors are mutually complementary, but it is just because war behaviour and most other forms of behaviour may be considered as variations on a few fundamental themes that one is justified in concentrating largely on the only data that can account for the nature and development of such variations, namely the social-psychological factors outlined in the preceding section.

Finally, it should scarcely be necessary to point out that the psychological analysis of war is in no way contradictory to the study of war in terms of the political and economic structure of society. These are true causative factors, but it may be observed that the attempt to account for war exclusively by their means would leave important lacunæ. For not only are such psychological processes as, for example, the development of sympathetic and antipathetic attitudes towards the in-group and the out-group, primary conditions of warfare, but also the influence of economic and political factors themselves cannot be studied adequately apart from the psychological mechanisms through which they are able to transform the behaviour of men.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL IDEAS

By WERNER FALK

THE sociological interpretation of political, religious, legal, or artistic ideas has become more and more popular in the recent development of sociological thought. There is a growing tendency to deal with the connexions between ideas and the social structure to which they belong, instead of analyzing them in the traditional way from the standpoint of their inherent political, religious, legal, or æsthetic meaning. The question arises of how far the modern sociological and the traditional systematic approaches are related to each other. This paper is intended to elucidate the problem. Special prominence will be devoted to one point—the contrast between the traditional philosophical and the modern sociological interpretation of ideas. In so doing we shall concentrate on political ideas and especially on the notion of liberty.

I

Instead of historical introduction, I shall merely indicate the place of the sociology of ideas in the general framework of modern thought. It is a step towards secularization, the objective of which is the transition from all forms of supernatural and transcendental determination to an immanent and empirical one in man's relation to nature and to himself. Only when approached in this way can the problem of the sociology of ideas be properly appreciated.

Although the sociology of ideas developed along various lines, Marx is to be regarded as its effective originator. At his hands it received its most uncompromising form, its most detailed elaboration, and with him the theory attained its most intimate connexion with the central questions of political

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

and social development. One cannot conceive Marx apart from the French and English tradition of enlightenment which he assimilated. Setting out from its empiricism, he developed his critique of German idealism. Marx had to face the two extremes of philosophical development which had not been clearly differentiated in the eighteenth century, but had become sharply accentuated with the advent of German idealism : the antithesis of reason and experience, intellect and emotion, freedom and necessity, competing in succession to the supernatural order as the basis of thought and action.

The rôle of reason in German idealism was most firmly emphasized by Hegel, but at the same time it was he who once more imposed on it important limitations. Hegel was so important to Marx because he was both an opponent and a precursor. With the German romantics—who were influenced by Burke among others—Hegel sought to modify and delimit the libertarian spirit of the enlightenment as it was concretely manifested in the French Revolution. This he did by placing it in its historical context. Far more radically than had been done in any previous or contemporary theories of mental development, he showed that mind, reason, and ideas all evolve in historical sequence. Thus the libertarian spirit of the enlightenment was merely a rung in the ladder of spiritual development. These stages of development, moreover, do not exist except in the realm of pure thought. Ideas are borne by the empirical forces of history, by human passions and interests. Ideas evolve of themselves and are their own justification, but they employ the emotions in order to achieve realization. That is their cunning, that is the cunning of reason (*List der Idee*) ; it is the central point of Hegel's philosophy of history, which is intended to bridge the gulf between the world of history and the world of ideas.

In essentials there is only one important step from this to the philosophy of Marx. What he was able to use was the

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

concept of historical relativity ; that the ideas of a particular age are not unchangeable or absolute. What he had to change was the relation between ideas and history. It is true that the ideas are willed by the individual, that they emanate from his interests. But the individual uses the ideas, not ideas him. The ideas are *his* cunning, it is not *he* who is the cunning of his ideas. This is Marx's famous inversion of Hegel's philosophy. The ideas become an ideology : the liberty of the French Revolution, instead of being any longer one stage of pure mental development, becomes a form in which the bourgeoisie expresses its interests under conditions of free competition.

It is to misunderstand Marx's concept of ideology—and Marxism has itself occasionally fallen into this error—to assume that it altogether denies objective truth and necessity to ideas. One need only consider the great importance that Marxism attaches to the development of correct class-consciousness. The ideas of any age are the conscious expression of what the social groups in society are obliged to will under given circumstances. They are true or false according to their ability to express the situation adequately. Ideas are not less valid because they do not apply to everybody and to all times but only to people of a particular age. Ideas lose their validity only when new circumstances present new problems. Such ideas as have lost their validity are frequently termed ideologies by Marx. But the actual polemical point of his concept of ideology does not consist in this distinction. For him the liberty of the bourgeoisie is an ideology even when it does adequately express its historical determinants. What is really ideological in this is the form of reasoning. The bourgeoisie justifies its liberty primarily on philosophic grounds by deducing it from a conception of human nature in terms of psychology, ethics, or natural rights. In its negation of philosophy, Marxism attempts to exclude this traditional form of reasoning. Every kind of speculative deduction ought to be replaced by an historical and sociological

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

explanation. Political ideas arise and hold good only because they satisfy social and historical needs, and not at all because they correspond to certain needs which are immanent in human nature in general. The philosophical deduction of the concept of liberty is only a method for making conscious in a veiled form the sociological origin and significance of the ideas. Consciousness is ideological when it hides its real sociological motivation behind a veil of philosophical reasoning. This is what Engels meant when he said that Marxism represents the transition from the age of speculative philosophy to that of scientific explanation in politics.

In Marxist sociology the rivalry between philosophy and sociology for the interpretation of political ideas was decided against philosophy. But this did not wholly do away with the problem. Social philosophy seeks to preserve its independence and to defend itself against being replaced by pure historical, psychological, or sociological explanations. Obviously, it is an entirely different task to explain the social institutions of a nation by their historical and social development, from showing whether these institutions correspond with the general nature and purpose of the social order. "Social science," as Professor Hobhouse once clearly put the question, "cannot ignore the elements of idealism as a working factor, as one of the forces, if you will, among the other forces, which it studies; nor can it disregard the logical consistency or inconsistency of ideas, upon which their working force depends. Thus the philosophical, the scientific, and the practical interest, however distinct in theory, tend in their actual operation to be intermingled, and it must be admitted, that we cannot carry one through without reference to the other."¹

An attempt has been made to secure a formal resolution of the difficulties which sociology has created in this field by conceiving the difference between philosophy and sociology

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 14.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

as that between two different methods of reasoning. There is thus a choice : either to interpret the ideas philosophically, that is, in the way they appear subjectively to the individual, emanating from his ethics ; or, leaving this method aside, to investigate them in their sociological context. Without intending to provide a solution of the problem, Professor Mannheim has described the possibilities of this two-fold interpretation in a paper on "Soziologische und ideologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde."¹ A further stage in the separation of philosophic and sociological analyses is provided by the theory which perceives the contrast as only between a normative and a causal approach. The function of sociology, according to this theory, is to explain the empirical origins of ideas. But in addition, ideas may well be treated from a philosophical standpoint, an examination of their universal validity. The sociological approach is a matter of science, the philosophical of idealistic or metaphysical speculation. A compromise is thus reached in the strife between philosophy and sociology on the basis that each allows the other to follow its own course, without really considering its work essential to itself.

Against this formal method of reasoning we urge that instead of solving they merely avoid the problem. Marxist sociology denies the validity of the philosophical explanation on the ground that there is no actual object for it to explain. In reality there is an inter-connexion between the demand for liberty and competitive society, but no corresponding connexion between liberty and the fact that it may correspond likewise to a natural human desire. If this be true and philosophical analysis has no power to explain the meaning of a concrete historical idea, because the sociological are the only motives, then the philosophic interpretation is really of no value. It interprets relations which do not, in fact, exist ; it becomes an interpretation of self-deceptions. Thus the question whether a philosophic analysis is possible is really a

¹ *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, vol. ii.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

question as to whether there is an object to which it can be referred. The value of such analysis emerges only if it can show that to deduce liberty simply from social needs is going too far, and that there are other influences operative which derive from the universal desires of human nature. The question of philosophy versus sociology is thus inevitably bound up with the famous question of super-structure and basic structure, which plays such an important part in Marxist sociology. Are we right in resolving the so-called super-structure simply on sociological grounds, or are we perhaps driven to assume that something remains unexplained which suggests a more general source for its origin and justification? Does the historical idea of liberty perhaps arise from the fact that social *and*—shall we say—ethical-anthropological, particular *and* general conditions merge in it? The simple derivation of the super-structure from the basic structure would in this case be altogether questionable. Beneath the super-structure of ethical and political norms lies hidden a two-fold basic structure. The question is then no longer merely the relation of super-structure to basic structure, of consciousness to reality; rather is it the relation of ethical and sociological determinants which find themselves juxtaposed and become conscious of themselves in the super-structure of ideas. I shall later discuss what reasons may be advanced for such an assumption; but in any case all sensible interpretation on philosophical lines must depend upon it. If there is in fact no such two-fold basis of political ideas, then philosophic analysis has no object and is pointless. But if there is such a basis, then philosophical and sociological analyses are co-equal and the choice between the two forms of reasoning disappears. It is only when both are used together that they can open the door to all the vital aspects of the subject.

I have especially adverted to this series of problems because in it are to be found the various endeavours of German sociology to assimilate what is fruitful in the Marxist approach without at the same time participating in minimizing the

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

importance of super-structure. In the works of such authorities as Max Weber, Alfred Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim, the problem appears in various forms as to what limitations, if any, are to be set to the sociological and historical relativity of ideas, and where its peculiar significance and effectiveness begins. I may cite a few instances in illustration. Max Weber's attitude to these problems is not stated explicitly, but appears clearly in incidental allusions and in his empirical studies. His sociology of religion is intended, to a large extent, to throw light on the boundaries of the sociological interpretation which he himself employed. His essay on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* aims primarily at showing how much the discovery and the deliberate education of a new ethical type of man are pre-conditions of modern capitalism. He emphasizes the equal possibility of materialistic and spiritual interpretations of culture and history and that both must be applied for the explanation of social phenomena. How this dualism is possible and in what relation ethical and sociological developments stand towards one another in a final analysis, is left open. To Max Weber this would have come within the scope of the philosophy of history, which was denied by his positivist scepticism. In reality, according to the conception of history as developed in his works, there is in the sphere of ethics and religion an irresolvable residue of motives, which burst into the social and economic sphere and its causal development, and the irrationality of which cannot, moreover, be explained. The tendency of modern capitalism, through the growth of rationalism in all spheres of life, is indeed to confine more and more the influence of the irrational element and thus to extend the scope of the causal method in sociology. But even within the rational causality of modern life there still remain some individuals who, while recognizing and employing the mechanism of society, are nevertheless guided in their own decisions by the ethical and irrational standards of their consciences.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

Troeltsch's approach in his sociology of religion is related to that of Weber. He, too, is concerned with the two-fold problem. "How far," he asks, "are the origins, the growth and the changes in Christianity sociologically conditioned and how far are they not rather active sociological determinants?" Troeltsch analyzes the sociological and historical conditioning of the social teachings of Christianity. But the contents of these teachings are not exhausted in their sociological significance and conditioning. They are rooted in another, non-sociological source which in turn influences, sometimes with greater and sometimes with less effect, social and economic institutions. The question of the link between these two sources is dealt with by Troeltsch not, indeed, in his book on *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, but in his *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*. Historical evolution can be comprehended only by the aid of some standards, by the conception of a fundamental end, which develops within it and which it either approaches or departs from. Sociological and historical study demonstrates, however, that there is no such end, that all standards are relative to the age and to the people who will them. Troeltsch is faced with the difficulty that historical evolution is always concerned with ends which transcend mere historical and sociological significance and in which the present finds itself linked to the past; but that, on the other hand, all previous attempts failed and perhaps, in fact, had to fail to define this residue as inevitable in the form of an absolute and unchanging end. Troeltsch died before he could proffer his solution in the projected second volume of his *Historismus*. Mannheim, in an essay on Troeltsch, rightly doubts whether he could, on his assumptions, arrive at any solution.¹ None the less the invaluable achievement of his *Historismus* is that he, more than anyone else, revealed the inner dialectic of the problem in the analyses of the whole of the modern philosophy of history.

Max Scheler, in his book *Die Wissensformen und die Gesell-*

¹ Karl Mannheim, "Historismus," in *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft*, vol. 52.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

schaft, endeavoured to solve these problems in a magnificent attempt to formulate them within the framework of a philosophic system. He tries to link together philosophic idealism and sociology. For the contrast between super-structure and basic structure he substitutes the similar contrast between ideal and material factors. (*Ideal- und Realfaktoren.*) But these two, ideas and society, bear a different relationship to one another from that in Marx. Ideas are eternal ; they are valid only because they have a general metaphysical content. Their philosophic validity, however, is altogether different from their concrete realization. Here the effectiveness of the material factors makes itself felt. These select from the potentialities of eternal values such as serve their particular ends and thus translate them into reality. The notion of liberty is thus realized through the interests of the bourgeoisie, but it is valid because it is part of the eternal values of mankind. The world of ideas is thus, as with Hegel, distinct from the sphere of history ; it is only linked up with the latter through the effectiveness of particular interests. The cunning of ideas in finding their respective interests, Scheler will not admit. Their part is a passive one, their realization dependent upon the accident of finding interests with which to ally themselves. The small chance which ideas have of exercising influence must further be decreased, according to Scheler's pessimistic philosophy, to the extent that, in an ageing culture, the economic factors become increasingly prominent. Thus, in regard to the present phase, it is significant that Scheler, like Max Weber, approaches more closely to the conclusions of Marxism. The difficulty of combining philosophy with sociology is also very apparent in Scheler. There is always the danger either that what is of universal validity will be entirely submerged in historical and sociological motivation, or that it will become so divorced from the latter that its connexion with it will no longer be recognizable. This difficulty was present in Troeltsch and is even more marked in Scheler. The separation of eternal

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

ideas and empirical interests appears artificial if we but glance at the actual history of ideas. We observe that the notion of liberty is valid not only on general, but also on sociological and historical grounds : in addition, that the general basis of the ideas on the whole becomes discredited with the lapsing of their historical motives. The concept of human nature changes with historical evolution. This change means more than a mere discovery of ethical potentialities which had always existed. We observe that man, together with all his ethical potentialities, has evolved and changed in the course of history. And if such changes, moreover, are necessarily limited by his ethical and anthropological make-up, this is not to say that what may develop out of it is inevitably fixed, once and for all, in a world of eternal ideas. Mannheim, in a paper on *Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens*, expressed most definitely this criticism of Scheler : " We do not assume that ideas are pre-existent, that they exist in themselves, separable from history and the facts. For us not only the possibility of acknowledging the ideas, but also their own existence and fate is bound to the process of history—the ideas themselves are dynamic." ¹

II

There has always been a dangerous tendency in Marxism to regard the connexion between social structure and political ideas too simply and mechanically. With the single exception of Lukács, in his treatise on *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Marxism has hardly taken into account how profoundly the whole type of human behaviour becomes transformed with social change. Every age, with its altered circumstances, has also a new ethical system. It produces a new type of man who discovers and uses anew his powers and faculties, his reason and will. The bourgeois hearkens to the dictates

¹ *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. 53, p. 630. Mannheim has still further elaborated his own point of view in his book on *Ideologie und Utopie* and in the article on Wissenssoziologie in *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

of his natural emotions and to the immediate impulse of his reason, in the same way as the individual in the Middle Ages was suspicious of this guidance and trusted in a divine order and the authority of the Church. The becoming effective of the social environment is preceded by a particular kind of *subjective* behaviour towards that environment. Thus from among these effects, only such are selected a priori as lie within the sphere of social interests. One of the most interesting parts of Lukács's work, in fact, is that in which he deals with the ethic of German idealism from this point of view. In Kant's ethical system the individual's will is considered subjectively free, but objectively bound by the inevitable causation process. To Lukács, this ethical system is the spiritual organ of a bourgeoisie, through which the interests of the individual may be morally justified and limited as far as is necessary, without at the same time allowing the problem of a planned order of society to enter into the sphere of his consciousness and conation. Going farther than Lukács, Mannheim in particular has referred to the sociological determinations which are already implicit in the active behaviour of the individual. He has shown, in particular with regard to the theory of knowledge, that the categories employed in our enquiries into reality are already preformed in the light of what we wish to find on the basis of our social viewpoint.

Lukács's studies have contributed a great deal in Germany to the refinement of Marxist sociology. His value from the point of view of our problem consists in the fact that he deals with questions of ethics and practical reason from the standpoint of Marxist sociology. But his attempt also labours under a great weakness. He pays only a one-sided attention to the adaptation of ethics to social needs. But here we arrive at the point where the traditional philosophic reasoning asserts itself even for the sociologist. In the sphere of ethics, as in the sphere of knowledge, it is not possible to achieve everything demanded by social needs. Social needs alone

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

could never have produced our modern natural sciences, without lighting upon rational empirical judgment as a faculty capable of development. The laws underlying cognition are not created but postulated by the social needs. But what has, with reason, been so often said of knowledge holds good too of ethics. A free life can be demanded by social needs ; but the ethical conditions whereby self-determination and self-responsibility are possible to individuals are subject to their own peculiar logical rules. The point at which liberty comes up against necessity, the extent to which emotions and interests require regulating by reason and will, the question how far the individual's reason is strong enough to order his own life and that of society, these are problems which social requirements cannot resolve. It is essential therefore, not only to understand, with Lukács and the Marxists, how very much the notion of liberty is adapted to the particular requirements of bourgeois freedom. It is equally essential to note how far this ethical conception corresponds to a new and superior insight into the ethical and spiritual possibilities of human nature. Man in modern times, by substituting for the mediæval authorities the dictates of his rational experience and self-determination, represents a stage in ethical and spiritual evolution whose problems are the traditional subject of philosophy, and in which there are truth and falsehood, progress and decline. Thus the ethical outlook of every age is twofold : on the one hand it is a development of the social interests and an adaptation of their needs ; on the other hand, it represents in itself a new solution to the perpetually recurring problem of the possibilities and limitations of human nature. Its success can be estimated too by the degree to which it elaborates, refines or supersedes the solutions of the past.

From the standpoint of social mobility, its connexion with spiritual evolution in the above sense of the term is of great practical importance. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of the social needs, if they can demonstrate that the order

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

which they desire will prove to be an advance on the ethical practice of the past. The more adequate their general reasoning and the greater the scope they afford to new forms of behaviour, the greater will be their success. In doing so, they appeal to needs and aspirations which are no less real and attractive than economic interests. The historical success of capitalist interests cannot be grasped without realizing the fascinating vistas of superior avenues of development which the liberation of the individual opened out. The Marxist precept that "ideas have always failed where they were not the outcome of interests" might thus almost be reversed. The interests, too, in the long run fail if they cannot find ideas with which to ally themselves. Marx adopted a similar stand on the question of class domination. A class develops ruling potentialities when it has the opportunity of representing, for a moment in history, certain interests both of its own and of society as a whole. But on the whole Marx laid most stress on the fact that the particular interests are cloaked behind the general good and not on the fact that the notion of the general good contained any essential element of validity. Actually every group always represents itself as the protagonist of such ethical qualities as promote its interests. In the history of political thought, considered from the standpoint of the groups striving after political power, while the natural man always appears as malicious or weak and unreasoning, the necessity for leadership, education and coercion appears as insistent. On the other hand, those groups who struggle against domination by others find support in an optimistic conception of man, in his spontaneous qualities, his native virtues and intelligence. The concealment of particular interests behind an ideology is here self-apparent. But it is no less apparent that the interests do not ally themselves merely with illusions. From their point of view, the question of the possibilities of a free life arises once again and they search—of course, one-sidedly—to discover and to encourage such features as will lend them a more universal

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

justification. Their success depends upon a certain—though limited—attention and evolution in the sphere of ethics. The danger of sociology is that it tends to put so much emphasis on the social and economic facts that the objective of these facts and the substance of history are lost. I refer to man, whose aim is not merely to earn a living, but to develop himself and to broaden his experience within the framework of his own faculties. Every step taken for social reasons is at the same time an inevitable contribution to the lasting end of human self-realization.

We observe here the intimate connexion between philosophy itself and social development. Every age presents its peculiar demands and aspirations to philosophy and asks philosophy to examine their ethical possibilities and necessities. It is true that a large part of philosophic effort is exhausted simply in adapting itself ideologically to the demands of the age. But over and above this, philosophical achievement, or, rather, the total output in the sphere of ethics of the intellectual and literary world, has its own essential function in the social process. To my mind it is misleading to divorce philosophy from real life, and to regard all effective historical change as the resultant only of interests. Philosophy does not merely discover the ethical qualities on which the social needs rely, but also acts as a medium for their dissemination. It is on these lines that I conceive the educative value of the Protestant ethic in the growth of capitalism. It is not a reflection of social interests, but a bringing out of such qualities in the ethical sphere as are necessary with regard to the new social needs. In no other way did nineteenth-century liberalism elaborate the general ethical background of a free society. In practice, too, it helped to develop the critical faculty of the individual, his readiness to submit to agreement by discussion and the quality of compromise which, on the part of the individual, are the conditions for the smooth working of a democracy. The liberty demanded by society is possible only if all those

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

functions are developed in the ethical sphere which self-determination postulates. This is the point at which we recognize the ethical problem both as dependent on time and in its comparative independence of it. Max Scheler, with his pessimistic view of the importance of the mind, frequently employed the analogy of the torchlight of interest which always casts its rays on the one side of the ethical problem and leaves the other in darkness. This analogy ignores the fact that, proceeding from the same social starting-point, it is possible to attain conclusions whose sociological implications are indeed similar, but whose philosophical qualities differ from one another. The sociological bias determines the questions whose answers are primarily sought. But this does not completely determine how widely the realm of the ethically possible is opened out.

Philosophy itself adds to the given problems by refining them on ethical lines, and linking them up with the tradition of spiritual development. Its conclusions are thus dependent upon the strength of the philosophical, and not merely on that of the sociological impulse. A sociology of philosophy is therefore misguided if all that it does is to show that Kant, too, was a bourgeois. The important thing is not just to show the proximity, but also the distance from the social requirements, the ever-new synthesis into which a sociological standpoint enters, in every case, with the consistency of a philosophic consciousness. Philosophy's enduring achievement lies in what has been achieved philosophically and not in what was desired sociologically. Hegel, for instance, in common with many other thinkers of his day, had political reasons for discovering a compromise between the bourgeois and the monarchical and feudal interests. But none of them dealt with the contrast between conservative aims and the philosophical tasks of an enlightened rationalism as consistently as he. No one, therefore, discovered such universal categories, in criticism of the liberal idea of the state, as did Hegel, in whom the most diverse political move-

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

ments were thus able to find their inspiration. On the other hand, the possibility of philosophical refinement of the socially predetermined conclusions should not lead to the fundamental neglect of the sociological relativity of philosophic thought. The same social standpoints are capable of leading to conclusions of the most varying philosophical complexion. Different social standpoints, however, can never lead to the same philosophical conclusion. In this respect, too, the analogy of the torchlight of interests is misleading. The fact that ethical problems and their solutions are always seen in one perspective is more than a pure matter of cognition. Every age demands not only that certain ethical qualities be preferable ; it will also be content with certain defects, if the conditions are favourable. The readiness to compromise as a postulate of democracy rests, as is well known, not only on the shoulders of individual rationality, but also on a stipulated and existing homogeneity of interests. It may be that nineteenth-century ethics valued too highly this capability. Nevertheless, its development in this form was justified by the circumstances of the period, because those circumstances rendered possible and indeed nurtured that development. What appears to be doubtful from the standpoint of critical ethics can yet be justified by the attendant social conditions. Its evolution becomes an acute problem only if these conditions are superseded. If an ethical consideration means more than mere description, but also the realization of a new type, then we can perceive the limitations set upon ethical evolution. There is a point beyond which it over-steps its limits and comes up against the bounds set by social conditions. And here it must halt or else transform those social conditions. There are transitional phases in which, in over-stepping those bounds and broaching the question of the social conditions necessary for realization, ethics become revolutionary. That they should take this step was demanded of the philosophers by the youthful Marx, when he said that philosophers in the past

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

had only interpreted the world, whereas they might have changed it.

I have endeavoured to show that the function of ethical consideration lies in the intermediary rôle which it plays between the claims of society and the claims of human nature. It elaborates those qualities demanded by society. But at the same time—and this is the last point I wish to make in this connexion—it subjects the realization of the social requirements to a certain control and correction. If the social needs are subjected to ethical examination, they become dependent upon the special qualities that are capable of development and upon the minimum thereof necessary to every social order to maintain its vitality. A theory of the state which stresses the inevitability of compulsion on social grounds will also provide a place for liberty, if it attempts to show that its view of the state is ethically superior to that of liberal tradition. In its motivation, too, it will be bound to the stage of thought attained in the past. If rational and empirical justification was valid in the past, it is difficult for the present to revert to irrational forms of justification. Such a reversal can be attempted when it corresponds to the interests of a group. But its ideology will suffer from the defects and contradictions of its premises and will lay itself open to criticism. This point could be illustrated by the great difficulties experienced by Fascism in elaborating a theory of rulership. It is difficult for it to develop a rational basis because of the antagonism within the constituent social elements and ends which it seeks to unite ; but it experiences no less difficulty in developing an irrational basis in a society with a tradition of empiricism. Such a society does not thereby adopt beliefs in the old sense of the term, if certain of its interests are in conflict with rational justification.

Thus a synthesis is sought in the ethical justification of social interests, in the attempt not only to adapt man to the social requirements, but also social interests to ethical necessities both in their entirety and at a certain stage of evolutionary

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

development. How far such a synthesis can be successfully achieved in any period is another matter. History affords no guarantee of the safe delivery of such social requirements as will, in all circumstances, facilitate the synthesis on a progressive and well-balanced stage of ethical development. We cannot to-day share Hegel's optimism concerning the cunning of ideas. On the contrary, we have rarely had so critical a period as the present, so threatening a danger that, instead of evolving further or even maintaining their achieved standards, the social requirements will debase all that the past built up, on the basis of favourable social circumstances co-operating with ethical and intellectual endeavours. I do not wish to over-estimate the importance of ethical criticism in the control of social interests. Where the interests are bent on gaining unlimited power, they will not be restrained by reference to those ethical qualities inherent in liberty. Scheler's pessimism applies to such tragic situations in history. But there exist not only interests made unscrupulous by despair and undeterred by consequences. There are also interests prepared for moderation and compromise with ethical judgments. Where ethical consideration can find support in the latter interests, there it is given some scope for setting its decisions against the naked will of social requirements.

The task which probably lies before us is not to be solved from the standpoint of traditional Marxist sociology. To change the external social and economic conditions is not to exhaust all the problems of a future order. The future may bring forth various essays in the planning of production ; in every case it will change the potentialities of individual behaviour in such a way that the function of the collective will is emphasized and the liberty of the individual is diminished. The creature envisaged by nineteenth-century liberalism cannot be reconciled with an order which seeks to unite millions of individual wills in the realization of common ends. The tasks set by economic and social conditions demand a behaviour in which coercion and acquiescence,

leadership and subservience, inevitably play a much more prominent rôle. The behaviour demanded by social and economic conditions is opposed to that postulated by the ethical standard of liberty whose usefulness was brought into prominence in the past. It is precisely this internal conflict which Marxist sociology cannot grasp. It regards the possibility of a new order as dependent entirely on the change in economic conditions. That new social requirements need new forms of individual behaviour and that with regard to such forms there is the problem of what is ethically admissible—this is accepted no more as regards the future than it was as regards the past. In the conception of the future which Marxist sociology seeks to elaborate, the question as to how co-operation may be rendered possible between the social and the ethical requirements remains obscure. It does not use its opportunity of showing how socialism, as regards the past, might present not only a necessary economic, but also a possible and original ethical solution. The failure of this synthesis, as illustrated in Russia, clearly reveals the dilemma in which Marxism lands itself. The compulsion exercised by dictatorship is not anchored in a general theory of the state. It can only be explained as provisional, and it is all the more irksome because it knows no ethical standards by which it can be limited and controlled. Unconditional coercion on the grounds of suitability as a practical reality, the complete absence of sovereignty as an axiomatic utopia, this is the point at which reality and ideal take leave of one another. It is astonishing what little use Marxism has made, in its theory of the state, of the possibilities inherent in its dialectic, of a rational development of the bourgeois idea of liberty.¹ The dialectic has not been productive in the Marxian theory of the state, but only in its conception of class-consciousness, which is not a spontaneous reaction on the part of individuals,

¹ On the relations between the Marxian dialectic and the idea of liberty see Werner Falk, "Hegel's Freiheitsidee in der Marxschen Dialektik," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. 68.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

but is achieved by means of political leadership and rational education. According to dialectic rationalism, the behaviour of the individual corresponds neither to the independence of the liberal ideal nor to the servility of an authoritarian collectivism. Applied to the state, dialectic rationalism might possibly show a way to a synthesis between the social and the moral needs. This synthesis would have to mediate between the control increasingly demanded by mass-democracy and organized economics and—on the other hand—the preservation of the spontaneous, critical and self-responsible mind, which is asked for by the moral nature of men as a basis of their personal efficiency. It is a weakness of all merely pragmatic doctrines, which are followed as well by the Marxists as by the Fascists, that the development of this very synthesis is not within their reach ; neither of them acknowledges the task included therein. But the idealistic position is equally unable to satisfy this demand. It fails to recognize not only that the realization of the ethical requirements depends on the social conditions, but also that new social conditions demand a new critical examination and revision of the traditional ethical standards.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

By DAVID V. GLASS

THIS study covers the period from 1858 to the present day. It does not analyse conditions prior to 1850, since divorce was so special and costly a procedure as to prevent it from being a sociological phenomenon in the broad sense. It is, however, advisable to mention a few facts about this previous period for the sake of comparison. Although the annulment of marriage by the Church was possible in early times, there was no real divorce (that is, divorce *a vinculo*) until 1552, when the Marquis of Northampton had his second marriage declared valid by a "Commission of learned men" on the grounds of his first wife's infidelity. This decision was confirmed by Act of Parliament, and it was by this means—private Act—that divorces were obtained in the succeeding centuries. Writing of private Acts, the Commissioners appointed in 1850 to examine divorce law stated: "By these means, the right to obtain a divorce *a vinculo* was definitively established, . . . but in the rudest and most inconvenient manner, for the proceeding was a judicial one by legislative process, and had all the inconveniences which necessarily result from the discussion of such a question in a mixed and popular assembly."¹ After the end of the seventeenth century such Acts became more frequent, and between 1715 and 1775 sixty were passed. But only 110 were passed during the period 1715 to 1852, an average of less than one a year. Divorce was evidently reserved for the very rich, since the cost was prohibitive for the ordinary person.²

The Commission appointed in 1850 to examine divorce law reported in 1853. The enquiry was by no means exhaustive, and the Chairman, Lord Campbell, stated in the

¹ Report of Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 1912. The figures relating to early divorces are taken from this Report.

² Thomas Hall, the defendant in the famous case, *Regina v. Hall*, 1845, reckoned it as between five and six hundred pounds.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

House of Lords that the object of the Commissioners was not to alter the law, but the procedure whereby the law was carried into effect.¹ That some modern egalitarian sympathy did, however, exist is shown by the attempts made by Lord Lyndhurst and others to amend the Matrimonial Causes Bill by making the position of women the same as that of men as regards grounds for divorce. But these attempts were unsuccessful, and the resultant Act—the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (20 and 21 Vict., c. 85)—provided that whereas a husband might petition for divorce if his wife were guilty of adultery, a wife might only petition if her husband were guilty of adultery plus some other factor or factors—incestuous adultery, adultery and bigamy, adultery and cruelty, adultery and unjustifiable desertion for two years or more, rape, sodomy, or bestiality. This inequality continued until the reform Act of 1923, and is reflected in the petitions and decrees of the nineteenth century. The only important amendments to the 1857 Act were those of 1860 and 1866, which decreed that divorces were not to be made absolute until the expiration of a period of six months after the judicial verdict. That is, these amendments made it possible for the court to quash the verdict either on grounds of collusion, or if the parties consented to be reconciled.

In November 1909, the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was set up, and, after thorough investigation of the divorce law here and abroad, reported in 1912. The Commission published two reports—a Majority one, and a Minority report, signed by the Archbishop of York, Sir W. R. Anson, and Sir L. T. Dibdin. The main questions which the Commission had to consider were, first, should the law be amended so as to place the two sexes on an equal foot-

¹ The method of procedure was, according to Mr. Justice Maule (*Regina v. Hall, op. cit.*), first, sue wife (or husband) for damages; secondly, obtain the Ecclesiastical decision (under the Act of 1798); and then go to the House of Lords for the legalization of the Ecclesiastical verdict. The 1857 Act transferred jurisdiction in matrimonial cases from the spiritual courts to a new "Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes" in London.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ing as regards the grounds on which divorce might be obtained, and secondly, should the law be amended so as to permit of divorce being obtained on any, and if any, what grounds, other than those already allowed? As regards the first question, the Majority report noted that the Ecclesiastical Courts gave divorce *a mensa et thoro* on equal grounds to men and women, that equality of grounds for divorce *a vinculo* had long been customary in Scotland and the Commissioners saw no reason why that should not be the case in England. To the second question the Commissioners recommended as grounds for dissolving marriage—adultery, wilful desertion for three years or more, cruelty, incurable insanity after five years' confinement, habitual drunkenness found incurable after three years from the first order, and imprisonment under a commuted death sentence. The minority report agreed to equality of grounds for divorce, but stated that "there are reasons which lead us to think that the State is called rather to strengthen than to relax the strictness of its marriage-laws." In spite of that statement, however, there was surprisingly little disagreement; it occurred mainly over the questions of desertion, cruelty, drunkenness, and commuted death sentences as divorce grounds. The signatories recommended that seven years' desertion should allow the petitioner to presume the death of the defendant. They thought that the inclusion of cruelty as a ground was capable of too wide an interpretation and would lead to much collusion. Drunkenness, on the other hand, might be amenable to treatment in view of medical progress, and since an epileptic was not penalized, a drunkard should not be. Finally, it was too difficult to draw the line as regards commuted death sentences. After all, there was not much to choose between such and a sentence of fifteen years' penal servitude.

No Bill was, however, modelled on the findings of the Commission, and the war then intervened and diverted attention from the subject. The whole question came up again in the post-war period; and in view of the part women

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

had played during the war, there was a much greater willingness to give them equal treatment. The result was the Matrimonial Causes Act of July 1923 (13 & 14 George V),¹ which allowed a wife to petition for divorce on the ground that her husband had committed adultery since marriage (and since the passing of the Act), "provided that nothing contained herein shall affect or take away any right of any wife existing immediately before the passing of this Act." This Act has had a most important effect on the rate and type of divorces occurring in the last ten years, as will be seen when we come to analyse the actual legal statistics. Before the passage of the above Act, however, the 1920 Administration of Justice Act (10 and 11 George V, c. 81) had already made divorce cheaper and therefore easier by giving assizes the same powers "to try and determine matrimonial causes of any prescribed class, and any matters arising out of or connected with such causes" as were possessed by the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court.

One other point has not yet been mentioned, although it, too, has had a very considerable influence on the recent divorce trend—Poor Persons' Procedure. This procedure was initiated in June 1914, in a set of Rules of Court administered by a Government department, under what is now known as the Administration of Justice Act.² In 1926, the administration was transferred to the London Law Society and about ninety provincial Law Societies. The significance of this Procedure lies in the fact that it has introduced a considerable working-class element to the Divorce Courts, not only because a "Poor Person"³ can generally obtain a divorce for between £2 and £3, but because the judges are often more lenient in hearing their cases. Thus, for example,

¹ This was consolidated by the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act of 1925 (15 and 16 George V).

² For information on Poor Persons' Procedure, I am indebted to Mr. Hassard Short, Secretary of the London Poor Persons' Committee.

³ Poor Persons are those whose means do not exceed £50 (excluding wearing apparel, tools of trade, etc.) or, in very special cases, £100.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

circumstances which in normal divorce proceedings would invalidate a case are frequently ignored in Poor Persons' cases, while grounds which would be contested in ordinary courts are accepted in these.

INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA

The General Divorce Rate

This is merely a general analysis of the trends shown in the divorce rate. No attempt will be made to link up that rate with indices of business prosperity, for there are too many pitfalls to be met in a superficial correlation of the divorce rate with, say, the intensity of unemployment or the per capita income of a country. Some years ago Dr. Thomas, in her *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, suggested that more divorces occurred in prosperous years—the factor being the ability to pay costs of procedure, alimony, and so forth. This, then, might be her explanation of the divorce peak in 1921 and the secondary peak in 1928. We shall shortly attempt to show that there are other, and perhaps much more important factors causing those peaks, but for the moment it seems equally possible to make out a case for high divorce frequency in years of business depression. In the United States, for example, there was a very considerable increase in the number of divorces in 1930¹—hardly a prosperous year. Some of these might be accounted for by the fact that business men, formerly wealthy, were no longer able to keep their wives in luxury, with resultant revolt on the part of the wives. The cost question is, however, of great importance to the working class, and the divorce rate in this country was immediately affected by the institution of Poor Persons' Procedure.

Seen through either *decrees nisi* or *decrees absolute* (Charts I and II), the ten-year average of the divorce rate shows a very slow but continuous increase from the Act of 1857 to the end

¹ Cf. Dr. Alfred Cahen, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce*, and also 1930 U.S.A. Census, Preliminary Report of Marriage and Divorce.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

of the nineteenth century. The 1900 rate (on *decrees nisi*) was less than double that of 1858, while the yearly rates themselves showed considerable fluctuations.¹ Nor did the period 1901 to 1913 show much difference, the maximum rate rising to only 0.65 on the eve of the war. But the trend does show that by 1914 divorce had established itself as a social phenomenon, although one restricted to a definite monetary class. The cost of divorce made this method of ending marriage quite impossible for any but the very wealthy.² In fact it is difficult to explain why the divorce rate should have risen at all in the nineteenth century. There was no relaxation in the law until 1923, and not only were women at a disadvantage as regards grounds for divorce, but whereas their lovers could be sued for damages, no such right existed so far as their own petitions were concerned. Divorces arose very largely on petitions by the husband. Of the *decrees nisi* granted up to 1923, in one year only were less than 52 per cent. granted on husbands' petitions,³ while during that period of sixty-five years, in forty-seven the husbands' petitions formed 56 per cent. or more of the total. But while these percentages show what might be expected in view of the existing law, they do not show it in sufficient degree to lead to the conclusion either that husbands "had it all their own way," or that divorce was used by a certain class of husbands merely in exercise of their privileged male rights. Divorce, it is certainly true, was restricted to a definite monetary class. Moreover, the very slow spread of liberal ideas

¹ The minimum rate was 0.172 in 1861, and the maximum 0.55 in 1897. See Table I. All the divorce rates quoted are on the basis of the number of divorces per 10,000 married population. It is obvious that a rate based on the total population, as was that presented by Sir John Macdonell to the 1909 Royal Commission, has grave faults. (Since Catholics are forbidden by their religion to divorce, a really refined rate should, I suppose, exclude the Catholic married population. Unfortunately no statistics are available for the purpose.)

² For this reason, Sir John Macdonell's estimate in 1908-9, that about 30 per cent. of the petitioners belonged to the working class, is obviously exaggerated. Even with Poor Persons' Procedure, the working-class proportion has not risen to more than 40 per cent.

³ That was in 1879, when the percentage fell to 49.4. There seems to be no apparent reason for this exception. The estimates throughout this study have been based largely on *decrees nisi*, since the statistics for them are more complete than for *decrees absolute*.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

on marriage in the nineteenth century probably still further restricted it to a minority in that class. The actual number of divorces shows this. But women were exercising their own rights much more strongly than might have been expected when we consider not only the added difficulties in petitioning for divorce, but also the far greater scandal necessarily resulting from the grounds on which they were forced to petition.

The war period saw a sudden jump not only in the divorce rate—from 0.65 in 1913, to 0.86 in 1917, 1.28 in 1918, and 2.05 in 1919 (*decrees nisi*)—but also in the proportion of divorces granted on husbands' petitions—67.75 per cent. in 1917, 70.5 in 1918, and 77.7 in 1919.¹ Both these facts were to be expected. In the first place, the war meant, in addition to long absences from home on the part of husbands, an abnormal tension resulting, for some people, in a high degree of sexual recklessness. The result was probably two-fold—some returning soldiers divorcing their wives for infidelity² (the majority), and some finding themselves no longer able to settle down with their wives, or their wives with them, and so perjuring themselves or fulfilling the necessary requirements for divorce. Secondly, the war gave rise to a number of marriages so unsuitable or purely "war-time" as necessarily to break down with the conclusion of war. Thus, while in 1913 only 16.5 per cent. of the total divorce petitions came from persons who had been married less than five years, in 1917 this percentage had risen to 22.1, and in 1919 to 23.4³—that is, in 1919 over 20 per cent. of the petitions related to war-time marriages. This factor continued to play an important part for the next two years. In 1920 the

¹ The percentage was 56.5 in 1912 and 58.7 in 1913.

² Infidelity for all kinds of reasons, though no data on that subject are as yet obtainable. Some for pure desire, some for loneliness, some to comfort soldiers on leave, others through inability to resist, or to gain extra rations for themselves or their children. But what, in general, were the men for whom they were unfaithful? Civilians or soldiers?

³ But this percentage did not rise to the degree expected by many social oracles. The majority of war-time marriages were probably those that would have occurred in any case. But whereas in normal times young people would have saved up for "a home," the uncertainty of life during the war caused many marriages to take place long before they would have done otherwise.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

percentage was 20, in 1921, 23·4, and it was not until 1923 that the figure fell to approximate normality again with about 17 per cent.¹ Thirdly, from 1914, with the institution of Poor Persons' Procedure, the working class began to enter the field of divorce. Table I shows the percentage of *decrees nisi* granted to Poor Persons for each year from 1917 to 1930. In 1917, '18, '19, '20, and '21, they constituted 22·6, 33·1, 35·6, 39·2, and 37·4 per cent. respectively. This means that in those years, Poor Persons added to the divorces which would have been granted had there been no Poor Persons' Procedure, 29·5, 50, 55·4, 64·5, and 59·8 per cent. respectively. Nor were Poor Persons of much less importance in the post-war period. During the period 1922 to 1930 in six of the years Poor Persons added not less than 45 per cent. per year to the other divorces. The curve on Chart I shows the estimated annual course of the divorce rate had there been no Poor Persons' Procedure.

The post-war period shows two peaks, but the reasons for each are quite different. The first, in 1921, is the culmination of the war period, the rise in war divorces being carried on till the various abnormal factors previously mentioned had settled down to a more normal equilibrium.² That the factors working in these years were a continuation of war phenomena is shown by the percentage of *decrees nisi* granted

¹ More detailed analysis (See Table II and Table C in the text) shows that in 1919, about 20 per cent. of the divorce petitions related to marriages which had taken place between the outbreak of war and 1917; in 1920, 17·8 per cent. to marriages between 1915 and 1918; and in 1921, 21 per cent. to marriages between 1916 and 1919.

² Since 21 per cent. of the divorce petitions presented in 1921 related to marriages celebrated between 1916 and 1919, it is interesting to look at the marriage rates in those years, and compare them with the rates in 1912.

—	March quarter.	June quarter.	September quarter.	December quarter.
1912 . .	10·0	16·5	18·2	17·7
1916 . .	14·7	16·0	14·3	14·8
1917 . .	11·0	13·6	14·7	15·7
1918 . .	14·2	14·4	16·7	15·9
1919 . .	13·1	21·7	22·6	21·6

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

on husbands' petitions, 75.5 per cent. in 1920, 70.5 per cent. in 1921, dropping to 58.4 per cent. in 1922, indicating a return to approximate pre-war conditions in this aspect of divorce.¹ But shortly after this lull, the 1923 Act was passed, giving men and women equality as regards grounds for divorce, and the divorce rate began to climb again, reaching an apparent peak in 1927-8. Since then, after a slight fall in 1929, it has continued to climb.² This climb shows one new and marked feature—the change in the proportion of divorces based on wives' petitions. 1923 could show no great change, since the law was not active until the end of the year, but from 1924 to 1930 the percentage varies between 58 and 60. That is, after the new Act, women occupy the position held in pre-war days by men as regards the number of divorces based on their petitions. It is important to look at the factors in this change. In the first place, many of the divorces granted to wives in the years immediately following 1923 were obviously pent up before. The change is not only in the proportion of wives' petitions to husbands', but in the absolute numbers. An estimate made of this increase shows that between 1924 and 1930, an addition of about 36 per cent. per year was made to the residual divorces as a result of the Act.³ Wives who had personal but legally

¹ Note, however, that petitions by wives against husbands showed a very considerable absolute increase in the immediate post-war years. This may have been due to chivalry on the part of husbands whose wives had been unfaithful, to the fact that war experience had made many men unbearable as husbands, or because there was a real inability to obtain some kind of harmony—through hasty war marriages or the psychological or physical effects of the war, including venereal disease—the wives being allowed to petition. Of the *decrees nisi*, those based on wives' petitions rose from 414 in 1918 to 1,237 in 1921.

² The apparent discrepancy between the rate based on *decrees nisi* and that based on *decrees absolute* as regards the exact peak year is due to the elapse of the six months' period specified after granting the decree in Court, so that a large number of decrees granted in 1927 would not be included in the absolute list until 1928. This would mean that the peak in *decrees nisi* actually occurred at the end of 1927, which may have been due to pressure of work in the Courts.

³ Chart I shows the estimated course if the 1923 Act had not been passed, and the importance of Poor Persons. It shows also that the residual rate—attributable largely to the middle class—is, however, rising too, but its rate of increase is only that of the late nineteenth century.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

unpermissible grounds for wishing to divorce their husbands before 1923 now found that the Courts gave those grounds legal validity. Secondly, when such grounds arose during the succeeding years, divorces could be and were obtained owing to the new legislation. Women were definitely taking advantage of the legal relaxation. Thirdly, the question of chivalry arises, but it is chivalry as conditioned by the existing social conventions. Before the war, not only was public opinion far more against divorce, but also the added grounds necessary for a wife to gain a divorce from her husband would have meant far greater scandal. Consequently even if a husband was willing to allow his wife to divorce him, the fact that his career would thereby be wrecked generally prevented him from doing so. Nowadays not only are the grounds easier for the wife, but adultery is no longer regarded as one of the very major sins, so it is probable that a good many divorces resulting from wives' petitions should really be granted to husbands.¹

The trend of the divorce rate in the United States has been markedly different. Leaving aside the question of differing legal stringency in the different States, which has given rise to a peculiarly American problem, that of migratory divorce² — by 1867 men and women were equally privileged so far as grounds for divorce were concerned. In addition, there have been no marked legal changes liberalizing the divorce law in the United States since that

¹ Desire to obtain a divorce might make a husband willing to pay his wife alimony, and this would tend to support the above statement. If chivalry on the part of husbands is a marked feature, then the curve in Chart I, adjusted to exclude the effects of the 1923 Act, is really too low. There are still some spheres, however, where the husband's career would be wrecked by divorce proceedings against him. This is notably the case in the academic and medical professions. In such spheres, the other kind of chivalry may occur—the wife allowing the husband to petition. In either case chivalry has been easier since the 1926 Act prohibited newspapers from reporting divorce proceedings in any great detail.

² Though, according to Dr. Cahen (*Statistical Analysis of American Divorce*), only about 3 per cent. of total divorces are migratory—this in spite of the notoriety given to Reno as a resort for intending divorcees.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

TABLE I.

Year.	I. No. of Decrees Nisi granted.	II. Percentage of Decrees granted to Husbands.	III. No. of Decrees Absolute granted.	IV. Divorce Rate. No. of Decrees Nisi per 10,000 Married Population.	V. Divorce Rate. No. of Decrees Absolute per 10,000 Married Population.	Year.	I. No. of Decrees Nisi granted.	II. Percentage of Decrees granted to Husbands.	III. No. of Decrees Absolute granted.	IV. Divorce Rate. No. of Decrees Nisi per 10,000 Married Population.	V. Divorce Rate. No. of Decrees Absolute per 10,000 Married Population.	VI. Divorce Rate (Decrees Nisi) eliminated.	VII. Divorce Rate (Decrees Nisi). Poor Persons and Wives affected by 1923 Act eliminated.	VIII. Percentage of Decrees Nisi granted to Poor Persons.
1858	179	57.5	*	.269	*	1901	601	62.2	551.2	.528	.485			
1859	141	63.0	140.5	.209	.208	1902	608	64.0	611.2	.528				
1860	127	53.5		.185		1903	614	64.2		.524				
1861	118	66.9		.172		1904	634	55.2		.536				
1862	153	68.6	151.2	.218	.209	1905	623	58.2	621.2	.516				
1863	160	59.3		.226		1906	650	56.0		.531	.503			
1864	166	60.2		.23		1907	598	55.5		.482	.504			
1865	147	59.9	173.4	.202	.226	1908	672	54.3	615.2	.536	.491			
1866	146	60.2		.198		1909	685	55.5		.536				
1867	144	60.5		.193		1910	588	52.2		.454				
1868	181	51.4	253.4	.238	.311	1911	655	56.6	562	.498	.42			
1869	186	54.3		.242		1912	690	56.6	569	.517	.426			
1870	194	58.3		.25		1913	870	52.7	546	.648	.406			
1871	190	58.5	322.0	.242	.372	1914	†	†	833	†	.610			
1872	203	53.7		.255		1915	†	†	668	†	.563			
1873	238	58.8		.296		1916	†	†	972	†	.856			
1874	281	60.5	331.0	.346	.364	1917	946	67.8	683	.862	.665			22.6
1875	304	60.5		.370		1918	1,407	70.5	1,082	1.278	.981	.854		33.1
1876	283	56.2		.339		1919	2,610	77.7	1,629	2.054	1.278	1.32		35.6
1877	322	59.3	345.4	.372	.372	1920	2,985	75.5	3,041	2.054	2.09	1.247		39.2
1878	380	59.2		.446		1921	3,957	70.5	3,458	2.63	2.298	1.645		37.4
1879	300	49.4		.348		1922	2,455	58.4	2,509	1.61	1.645	1.11		31.0
1880	340	57.9	344.0	.388	.350	1923	2,591	54.1	2,586	1.674	1.672	1.13	1.094	32.4
1881	302	59.2		.342		1924	2,454	39.8	2,249	1.564	1.434	1.24	.803	20.5
1882	345	52.2		.386		1925	2,656	39.2	2,563	1.654	1.61	1.383	.898	17.0
1883	361	64.0	331.0	.4	.364	1926	2,859	40.2	2,554	1.775	1.59	1.28	.796	27.9
1884	337	58.7		.369		1927	3,740	39.2	3,124	2.298	1.917	1.429	.763	37.6
1885	316	57.0		.344		1928	3,758	41.4	3,927	2.27	2.374	1.424	.856	37.1
1886	357	60.8	458.6	.373	.434	1929	3,392	41.7	3,333	2.028	1.991	1.37	.875	32.5
1887	390	56.5		.415		1930	3,722	42.9	3,482	2.2	2.06	1.415	.923	36.6
1888	392	57.6		.412										
1889	370	61.1	344.0	.386										
1890	400	57.7		.413										
1891	342	57.0		.349										
1892	354	54.8	458.6	.355										
1893	362	57.2		.358										
1894	381	54.6		.372										
1895	478	†	458.6	.46										
1896	486	61.5		.46										
1897	583	56.2		.545										
1898	436	59.6		.401										
1899	525	57.9		.476										
1900	494	59.7		.441										

* Averages only.

† Figures not available.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES


TABLE II.

	Condition of Parties in respect of Suits for Divorce commenced.				Percentage of Suits concerning 0 and 1 Child Marriages.	Grounds for Divorce.			Percentage of Divorced Persons remarrying.
	Duration of Marriage (Percentages only).					Percentage of Decrees Nisi granted to Wives for Adultery and Cruelty, and Adultery and Desertion, by Husbands.	Percentage of Decrees Nisi granted to Wives for Adultery by Husbands.	Percentage of Decrees Nisi granted to Husbands for Adultery by Wives.	
	Under 5 years' duration.	2 years and under 10 years.	5 years and under 20 years.	10 years and over.					
1899	15.9	41.1	72.2	54.5	65.2				
1900	16.2	43.7	71.9	53.8	65.3				
1901	15.5	41.5	73.6	55.4	63.9				
1902	12.8	44.3	74.6	54.0	63.8				
1903	12.9	40.2	71.2	56.8	61.5				
1904	14.4	41.5	72.6	55.5	62.2				
1905	16.5	47.1	72.8	50.3	65.3				
1906	17.1	44.5	69.6	51.8	66.1	97.2		99.2	*
1907	12.8	42.7	72.5	55.5	63.0	95.0		99.0	*
1908	14.5	43.2	72.5	54.5	68.2	93.0		99.2	*
1909	14.3	41.5	73.5	55.9	66.2	95.5		99.5	*
1910	15.3	43.4	71.9	53.4	69.8	93.3		99.0	
1911	17.0	46.2	71.8	50.0	64.3	94.8		99.8	60.5
1912	16.2	44.9	70.4	51.4	68.4	95.2		99.9	66.5
1913	16.5	44.6	71.9	49.6	68.5	98.0		99.5	74.0
1914	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	53.2
1915	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	62.6
1916	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	48.2
1917	22.1	45.6	68.6	48.9	62.8	94.4		99.6	40.4
1918	23.2	51.8	67.7	43.8	64.6	92.0		99.7	39.9
1919	23.4	54.9	71.9	44.1	67.3	94.4		99.2	40.9
1920	19.8	50.8	71.5	46.7	69.1	91.6		99.6	38.4
1921	23.4	53.0	67.5	44.9	70.8	93.5		99.5	40.8
1922	17.1	46.8	69.4	52.0	70.5	93.8		100	65.0
1923	15.5	46.9	73.1	52.8	72.3	92.3	4.0	100	56.5
1924	16.6	47.5	70.3	50.1	71.7	30.0	67.2	100	63.5
1925	15.7	45.4	71.1	52.6	72.6	12.0	86.6	100	59.2
1926	13.2	46.7	73.7	51.3	71.1	7.9	91.0	100	59.6
1927	13.9	47.1	72.8	51.1	71.5	4.0	95.4	100	56.0
1928	13.3	45.4	73.6	52.9	71.6	2.0	97.0	100	49.7
1929	12.9	44.9	73.0	53.3	71.8	0.6	98.7	100	65.1
1930	14.0	43.5	72.4	53.7	68.7	0.5	99.4	100	60.7

* Figures not available.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

CHART I



DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES




CHART II

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

date.¹ The divorce rate has thus just moved steadily upwards, showing no marked inflexions; and plotted on a semi-logarithmic projection, it practically describes a straight line. Consequently, it was quite possible accurately to forecast the future trend of American divorce at the end of the nineteenth century, and the estimate made by Dr. W. F. Willcox of Cornell University in 1891 applies almost exactly to the American divorce rate of 1930. According to this estimate, in 1980, of the two causes responsible for the dissolution of marriage (divorce and death), divorce will be responsible for about 50 per cent. of marriage breakdowns. Apart, therefore, from the fact that the divorce rate in England and Wales has never been much more than half the American rate, our rate differs in its lack of predictability. An estimate based on the figures for 1860 to 1900, when the rate of increase was not very different from that of U.S.A., would have been quite wrong for the period 1914 to 1930, because of the legal changes taking place in the latter period.² In recent years—since the 1923 Act—the divorce rate here does seem to be approaching the American figure, though it is possible that the curve will turn and merely parallel the American rate.³

Grounds for Divorce

Analysis of statistics in this connexion lead to the conclusion that the legal grounds are by no means the sociological reasons for divorce. Grounds change in general either as

¹ Again see Dr. Cahen: 1887–1906, 108 marriage and divorce laws passed, all of minor importance, and only seven being relaxations; 1922–8, sixteen legal changes, of which ten showed no liberalization, and the net result of these changes on the 1922–8 divorce rates were negligible.

² In Chart I, the lower dotted line of the estimated 10-year average (minus Poor Persons and wives affected by the 1923 Act) shows an approximate continuance of the nineteenth-century rate of increase. Even though the estimate is quite rough, there does, consequently, seem to be a very marked relationship between the legal changes and rate of increase of divorce in England and Wales.

³ If the slowed-down American rate of the last ten years persisted, while the England and Wales trend for the last ten years continued, our rate would reach that of the United States by about 1943 or '44.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

actual law or court interpretation changes. In the United States, the latter reason has been more important in instigating the change ; in England and Wales, it has been the former factor. A comparison of the United States figures with our own is valuable.¹

TABLE A

U.S.A. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, 1867 AND 1928

	1867.	1928.		
	Total Divorces.	Total Divorces.	Divorces to Husbands.	Divorces to Wives.
Adultery . . .	33	9	14	7
Cruelty . . .	13	47	38	56
Desertion . . .	41	32	45	26
Drunkenness . .	3	2	0	2
Neglect to Provide	2	7	0	6
Minor Grounds .	8	3	3	3

TABLE B

ENGLAND AND WALES. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, 1906 AND 1930

	1906.			1930.		
	Total Divorces.	Divorces to Husbands.	Divorces to Wives.	Total Divorces.	Divorces to Husbands.	Divorces to Wives.
Adultery	55.5	99.2	0	99.7	100.0	99.5
Adultery and Cruelty . .	27.2		61.5			
Adultery and Desertion . .	15.7		35.6			
Other Grounds	1.6					

As regards American divorces, Dr. Cahen writes : " The increasing leniency of the courts in interpreting mental cruelty no longer makes it necessary for any considerable proportion of couples to bear the shameful publicity of a divorce trial on infidelity. This change in the percentage of applications for divorce has not been due to modification of laws. The increasing laxity of judicial interpretations of cruelty as a ground for divorce is probably the result of a breakdown in social taboos against divorce. . . ." We too

¹ The statistics for the United States are from Dr. Cahen's *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce*.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

have seen the breakdown of such social taboos, but they have not as yet been strong enough so to alter the law as to allow mental cruelty as a valid ground. In England, as in the United States, petitioners almost always choose the easiest and least scandalous ground on which they can get their divorce. There are, of course, instances of the rarer and more scandalous grounds being used, but nowadays, as is shown in the above table, adultery is the general reason. Before 1923, this was not the case. Apart from the fact that it did not constitute a sufficient ground for wives until the new Act, there does also seem to have been something existing in public opinion in the case of husbands as to the reasons for divorcing one's partner. Although husbands were legally allowed to use adultery as the sole ground in petitioning, they did, however, use other grounds too before 1923—mainly adultery and cruelty, and adultery and desertion. These were probably true grounds, but there seems to have been a desire by the husbands to make their wives suffer as much notoriety as possible in these cases. The percentage of decrees granted on such grounds was always very small, but from 1922 onwards they drop out entirely. Since there is no reason to suppose that wives desert their husbands to any less degree since 1922 (in view of their greater ability to support themselves, the presumption is the other way) or even that they are less prone to cruelty, this omission of the "other grounds" is probably due to the chivalry mentioned in discussing the general divorce rate. As regards decrees granted on wives' petitions, the change resulting from the 1923 Act is very marked. While in 1922, almost 94 per cent. of such decrees were granted on grounds of adultery and cruelty and adultery and desertion, in 1924 that percentage dropped to 30, while adultery was the ground in 67 per cent. of the cases. After 1923, the other grounds tend largely to drop out; so that by 1930, adultery constitutes the sole ground in 99.5 per cent. of the decrees granted to wives. Here again, consequently, is seen the desire to obtain a divorce as easily,

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

and with as little scandal as possible.¹ The true grounds could be discovered only by personal investigation of individual cases, or by broad surveys of present-day family disintegration.

Duration of Marriage—and Number of Children

Whether divorce is the habit of a particular, immoral social class, as newspapers still pretend it is, or whether it is a serious indication of family disorganization, can be seen from the table on the duration of marriage. If the newspaper statements were true, most divorces would affect couples who had been married only two or three years. But Table C shows that, except for the abnormal war years, in practically every year from 1899 to 1930, over 50 per cent. of the divorce petitions filed related to marriages which had lasted for ten years or more.² (This should be compared with conditions in America, where about half the divorces occur in the first seven years of marriage.)

TABLE C

ENGLAND AND WALES. DURATION OF MARRIAGE

Percentages of Marriages of varying duration in respect of suits for dissolution commenced in the years given below

Duration.	1899.	1917.	1918.	1919.	1920.	1921.	1930.
Under 1 year . . .	0.1	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.7
1 year and under 2 .	4.4	4.4	3.2	2.1	1.9	1.6	2.2
2 years and under 5 .	11.3	16.6	19.0	20.2	17.2	21.2	11.1
5 years and under 10	29.7	29.0	32.9	34.6	33.6	31.8	32.3
10 years and under 20	42.5	39.6	35.0	35.2	38.0	35.7	40.0
20 years and over .	12.0	9.3	9.0	6.9	8.7	9.2	13.7

¹ This is further seen in the fact that adultery and cruelty dropped out much more rapidly after 1923 than adultery and desertion. The former is more difficult to prove and is considered more offensive.

² For the war period, see the Section on the general divorce rate. Since the statistical groups used by the Registrar-General are uneven, the modal year cannot be calculated accurately. The approximate modal year for divorce—1900 as well as 1929—is between the seventh and ninth after marriage. The mode in U.S.A., 1928, was the third year. See also Table C in the text.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

To elaborate, except for the war years, only once in the above period did more than 17 per cent. of divorce petitions concern marriages of less than five years' duration. Apart, therefore, from the fact that these conditions do not appear to have changed at all in the last thirty years, in spite of increased facilities for divorce, it is also apparent that petitions are only filed after serious consideration. They may be products of too hasty marriages—we have no statistics as to the length of the period between meeting and marriage—but at least some serious attempt is made to test the possible permanency of the marriage. Divorces do not, in other words, immediately follow the honeymoon.

Some elucidation of this fact is given, perhaps, by the relation between divorce and children shown in Table II. During the period 1899–1930, never less than 60 per cent. of petitions concern no- and one-child families,¹ while between 38 and 43 per cent. came from childless families. It would be absurd to suggest that in these families, birth control is practised in order that divorce should not leave children to encumber either parent,² and the absence of children does seem to be the constant factor in the two tables that have just been discussed.

Conclusion

We have seen that during the last seventy years the divorce rate has risen from 0.208 to 2.06 per 10,000 married population (or, if *decrees nisi* are used instead of *decrees absolute*, from 0.269 to 2.2) as compared with the American rise from 0.82

¹ It is true that almost 60 per cent. of divorcees remarry, and we know that some divorce suits are initiated purely because one (or both) of the partners wishes to marry someone else, but is that really a reason for believing that divorce petitions are generally filed with the object of remarriage? The remarriage more probably occurs because either the divorcees are willing to "try again," or they are young enough when divorced to fall within the normal marriage groups later.

² There is again a remarkable consistency in this percentage over the period. The slight increase after 1920 would be accounted for by the fall in the birth rate in recent years. In the United States in 1928, about 83 per cent. of the divorces occurred in no- and one-child families.

DIVORCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

to 3·65. We have also seen that nowadays over 30 per cent. of the decrees granted concern working-class families, but that the middle-class rate is rising too. Finally, it appears that while divorce is not generally a hasty step taken soon after marriage without any attempt to adjust differences in temperament, it does in general affect childless and one-child families. There remains the question—how important a phenomenon is divorce in this country to-day, and what will be its probable tendency in the future? The answer concerns not merely divorce but the whole problem of family stability in the existing environment, and this is far too broad and complex a subject to be dealt with cursorily. But a number of facts do project from the general mass. The old family has gone—the family that was bound together not only by mere father-mother and parent-children relationships, but also by the varied sociological functions which such relationships involved up to the latter part of the nineteenth century.¹ Many of these functions have been removed bodily by State and other institutions. It is even far less common nowadays for children to take their friends “home,” the films and boys’ and girls’ clubs providing non-family recreational centres.² In the rapidly changing conditions, in which such features appear, there is no time for adjustments to be made to new needs and customs, and family integrity thus tends to suffer from every blow struck even accidentally at it. In this country, for example, unemployment may have a serious effect on the family. Where there is a considerable rural population among whom fairly large-scale owner-occupancy is general, unemployment may tend to strengthen family ties. Unemployed children can be recalled from the towns and the farm worked by this instead of hired labour. The earlier three-generation family may thus tend to replace the more customary modern two. But

¹ See Mowrer, *Family Disorganisation*, passim, and Müller-Lyer, *The Family*, last two chapters.

² It is interesting to note that religion, which in general aims at stabilizing the family, helps to destroy this stability by providing some of the clubs mentioned.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

in England, where owner-occupancy still only accounts for a small proportion of agriculture, where the unemployed town-worker, if descended from agricultural parents at all, is descended more generally from farm labourers, and where living space is so restricted, unemployment tends to split up the family by forcing adult members to migrate in search of work. This, of course, concerns families in the heavy industrial areas rather than those in the metropolitan zone. Of the older family relations, therefore, only two are left—the husband-wife and parent-child, and these relations no longer involve all (or even many) of the former functions. In fact, child-rearing seems to be the only important remnant of earlier functions, and with the decreasing size of the family (as well as with the increasing participation of outside bodies in child-rearing and educating) this itself is losing much of its significance. If the one- or two-child family becomes common, some new relationship, or, rather, some new adjustment of the old relationship will be necessary to maintain integrity. The rising divorce rate appears to show that the adjustment has not been made, and that social convention is accepting this omission. In that case, it will take many years before the rising divorce rate slows down.

SOURCES USED IN COMPILING THE TABLES AND GRAPHS

Petitions and Decrees Nisi. For the period 1858 to 1910, the statistics presented by Sir J. Macdonell, C.B., at the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes of 1909. For the period 1910 to 1930, the annual numbers of Civil Judicial Statistics for England and Wales.

Decrees Absolute are given in the Registrar-General's Statistical Review—annual figures back to 1911, and decennial averages for the period before that.

The annual numbers of Civil Judicial Statistics were used for data on Poor Persons' Procedure, and also for statistics on the duration of, and the number of children in, the marriages of divorce petitioners. In recent years, however, these figures have been published in the Registrar-General's Annual Review, which also contains figures for the remarriages of divorced persons.

The Registrar-General kindly allowed me to use unpublished statistics in making estimates of the annual numbers of the married population from 1858 till the present day.

BOOK REVIEWS

PAGAN SURVIVALS IN MOHAMMEDAN CIVILISATION. By Edward Westermarck. *Macmillan*, 1933. 8s. 6d.

In this most interesting volume, consisting of lectures delivered at the University of London, Professor Westermarck has gathered together a large number of facts and beliefs (many already known from his larger works on Morocco) which seem to him of special interest in themselves or as bearing on wider problems. The author for the most part confines himself to Morocco; there are references to Egypt, but Islam outside North-West Africa scarcely comes into the picture. This is hardly surprising, for, apart from Morocco being the area that Professor Westermarck has made peculiarly his own, no other Islamic territory has been so closely studied from the aspect that these lectures illustrate. Indeed, for no other area is there anything approaching the body of organized knowledge upon which the lecturer could draw. It is, for instance, only necessary to consider his previous work on *baraka* to appreciate this.

Professor Westermarck arranges his material under five main heads: the *Jinn*, the Evil Eye, Curses, Holiness, Berber and Roman Ritual Survivals. The first glance shows the book to be a mine of magical ideas and practices, making it of particular interest and value for the whole of North Africa. Throughout Egypt and the Islamic portion of the Nilotic Sudan the Maghrabin—"Westerners," the people of Morocco and Algeria—are held in special reverence. They are looked upon as *par excellence* the practitioners of magic, Barbary to the Sudanese being the very home of the occult arts.

Perhaps the chapters concerned with the evil eye and Berber and Roman survivals are the most interesting. Who shall estimate the power of the eye: it "empties the houses and fills the graves"; alternatively, "it owns two-thirds of the graveyard," to quote two proverbs. There is not a department of life into which it does not enter. But it can be outwitted even when the desirous look is accompanied by speech, which increases the danger. Professor Westermarck once, when in danger of being "fleece'd" of valuable property, by his wit turned the tables on the aggressor: "If anyone evinces a strong desire to buy, let us say, my gun or horse, it is wiser for me to sell it, because, if not, the gun may easily come to grief or the horse die; and, as already indicated, if anyone praises a thing belonging to someone else without adding a word of blessing, the article is henceforth worth nothing. . . . During my stay in a place in the great Atlas mountains the Governor's son, who in his father's absence acted as my host, showed me great attention. He came now and then into my tent, sat down with evident pleasure

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

on my camp-chair—probably he had never sat on a chair before—and asked if he might look through my field-glass. He was so enraptured by these objects that I understood he wished to possess them, and custom had now required that I should do what he wished. Then it flashed upon me that I might pay him back in his own coin. He had come to me riding on a splendid mule. When he again began singing the praises of the chair and the field-glass I started similar admiration of his excellent mule. He at once turned the conversation to something else ; and the danger was at an end."

As to the origin of the idea of the evil eye, Professor Westermarck's suggestion at least accounts for a large element in the belief. "In accordance with one of the laws of the association of ideas, which generally play such an important part in magical beliefs, namely, the law of association by contrast, the praise or admiration of something good readily recalls its opposite—the more so as the future is always uncertain and fortune is not to be relied upon."

Moreover, "a superstition which is so widely spread cannot without strong evidence be regarded as the outcome of one particular people, especially when it can be traced to a psychological cause like that underlying the belief in the evil eye."

Much of this chapter is devoted to showing the influence on jewellery and design of the belief in the protective influence of the number 5, derived from the five fingers of the hand ; in fact, with its numerous illustrations this section constitutes a pretty example of a particular line of evolution in the decorative art of North Africa.

The section concerned with Berber and Roman survivals is for the most part devoted to the rites, neither Islamic in origin nor relics of Arab paganism, practised in connexion with the 'āshūra—the tenth day of Muḥarram, the New Year Festival of Islam. Now this and the "Great Feast" beginning on the 10th day of Dū'l-hijjah, the last month of the year, are, as Professor Westermarck shows, carnivals. In both there are masquerades, while in the 'āshūra a boat plays a part, though it is not stated whether it is on wheels as it frequently is in other Islamic and non-Islamic ceremonies. The masquerades and boat our author traces to Roman influence ; other notable features of the 'āshūra, the fire (leaping through fire, etc.) and water rites, he regards as of Berber origin, and for this view he produces excellent reasons.

Professor Westermarck's careful study of the 'āshūra masquerades does not show the presence in Morocco of an extremely interesting survival, which has been described in Algeria.¹ Here, near Biskra, a male and female figure, called respectively Yaghussa and Yauka, enter into the

¹ E. Doutté, *Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1909), p. 503.

BOOK REVIEWS

ceremony, and these are none other than the Yaghûtha and Ya'uqa mentioned in the Koran (LXXI, 23), the only pre-Islamic gods (so far as the reviewer can discover) who have so far kept their identity in North Africa as to be known by their old Arabian names.

C. G. SELIGMAN.

THE PROFESSIONS. By A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933. 25s.

There was, until this volume appeared, no single work describing the origin, nature, and functions of the professions as a whole, though there are separate histories of individual professions. The task involved in the enquiry was enormous, for the authors found it necessary to trace the history of all the professions, with the exception of the Church, the Navy, and the Army. They obtained the assistance of persons holding administrative positions in the professions described, and the facts may therefore be taken to be fairly correct. Criticism on this point is, however, disarmed by the authors' avowal that they have been "merely hurried visitors" to the territories described and cannot speak with the complete accuracy of those having inside knowledge. They have achieved their task with amazing success; the work is not a mere industrious compilation, but a thoughtful and thought-provoking study of the place of the professions in the life of the nation, their functions, their shortcomings, and their possible future.

The professions considered are Law (barristers, solicitors, patent agents), Medicine (doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, veterinary surgeons, pharmacists, opticians, masseurs, and bio-physical assistants), the Merchant Navy, Mine Managers, Engineers, Chemists, Physicists, Architects, Surveyors, Secretaries, Public Administration (Civil and Local Government Service), Teachers, Journalists, Authors, Artists, and Brokers.

A sufficiently complete history of each of these professions is given to enable the reader to understand its status and functions, and this part of the work occupies more than half of the book. The authors have shown remarkable insight in the pictures they have drawn, and have evidently studied each profession with sympathy. They have not shrunk from the dangerous task of criticism, but their language is always moderate, and no offence can be taken even in the rare instances noticed where, in the opinion of the present writer at any rate, their criticisms are not well founded. For a comprehensive and intelligent view of the professions in this country the book is invaluable.

The second part of the work is devoted to a careful examination and appraisal of professionalism as exemplified in the professions described. After a general survey of the rise of the professions, going

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

back to the twelfth century, the development of professional associations, and the intervention of the State to regulate the vocations by granting privileges and imposing duties, the authors proceed to describe the establishment of means of training and testing the competence of those who sought admittance to the professions. They show how the rise of the examination system in the early nineteenth century, following on the system adopted in the universities since the middle of the eighteenth century, led to the rescission of apprenticeship, so that now the universities and the professional associations both engage in the function of testing entrance by examination. There has inevitably been some competition between the universities and the professional associations, but rarely any serious conflict. There has, of course, in certain instances, been competition and rivalry between different associations in the same profession. In passing it may be well to point out that it is not quite correct to say, as on p. 318, that the universities have been aggrieved in the case of veterinary surgery because no place was given to them in the examination system. In the case of veterinary surgery the examination system dates from 1844, at which time the universities took no interest in the subject. The chartered examining body did, however, choose examiners as to almost half from university graduates in science and medicine, the rest of the board being qualified veterinary surgeons. It was therefore due rather to the passivity of the universities that they took no part in veterinary examinations until recent years; having sowed no seed, they could scarcely expect to reap a harvest. Three universities now grant degrees in veterinary science, and the first examination for these degrees counts *pro tanto* as exempting from the first examination of the chartered body.

The place of the universities in the training and testing of entrants to the professions is indeed a vexed question, but the authors are wholeheartedly on the side of the universities. In order to lead up to an examination of the educational systems of the different professions the authors, in Part III, describe the constitution of professional associations, their legal status, their internal organization, the various registers and registration authorities, and the general question of professional monopolies. This section is very well done. Your reviewer, however, holds the opinion, contrary to that of the authors, that there is very little indeed in the so-called monopoly granted to any profession, except those of dentistry, midwifery, and law. The authors say, p. 353, "The State, having set up a register distinguishing the qualified from the unqualified, may leave it at that; members of the public are then free to consult the unregistered practitioner if they choose. This is the position in nursing and architecture, and . . . teaching." But it is also the position in all the others, save the three mentioned above.

BOOK REVIEWS

The authors have given very careful consideration to the systems of education for the professions, and the synopses showing the nature of the examination system, and the methods of training, both theoretical and practical, are very illuminating. Those professions for which there is one recognized qualifying examination are called *uniportal*; others, such as Medicine, Dentistry, and Teaching, are called *multiportal*. The authors have also introduced an *intermediate* type for the Law, the grounds for the distinction being that, both for the Bar and for the Solicitors' Examinations, certain university students are excused part of the ordinary examination. But this does not make these professions any the less uniportal. If it did, then many of those called uniportal ought to be classified as intermediate on account of similar exemptions. The only really multiportal professions are the three mentioned, the qualifying examinations for the others being uniportal.

The authors pursue this question throughout the remainder of the enquiry. In a very important chapter they discuss the reform of the system of entry into the professions. They would co-ordinate the systems, placing the registration authorities under some sort of State control. Parliament should, they suggest, institute registration authorities, and the statute should define their constitutions and powers, but no more, the Privy Council being the controlling authority, having (a) the power to appoint representatives to the registration authority, (b) the power to approve standing orders and regulations, (c) the right to require annual reports from the authorities, and (d) the ultimate right of supersession. The chief duty of the registration authority should not be that of examining for admission to the professions as so largely obtains at present, but of keeping the register, with "the right to enter or refuse to enter a name upon it." But the authors "do not wish the registration authorities to possess any option in the matter" of the multiportal system, which they regard as of the greatest importance. This it is claimed, p. 393, is the system which after much and varied experiment has been found to work best. The writer of this review does not hold this view, but he acknowledges that the authors have stated their case with clarity. The three multiportal professions, Medicine, Dentistry, Teaching, are numerically very large; the system may therefore suit them. But it is very doubtful if the smaller professions would benefit by a multiportal entry. The reform most needed is the granting of a real monopoly, not a fictitious one, to the registered professions in return for the disabilities imposed upon them, in the interests of the public they serve, by their codes of professional honour. They are now, with few exceptions, on the one hand subject to the competition of the quack who can carry on his business unfettered save as to the use of a title

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

which means little or nothing to the public, while on the other they are compelled to rely on the doubtful chance that their unadvertised expertness will bring work to them. None of the professions will brook any interference with the present system unless in exchange for some more generous grant of privileges. The ideal pictured by the authors that all the professions shall ultimately be recruited from the universities will not be achieved so long as this country allows full liberty to the quack to practise on an unsuspecting and easily gullible public.

The discussion of the scope and objects of professional discipline, pp. 394 to 446, is excellent. It ought to be read by all those facile journalists who so glibly criticize the registration authorities, e.g. the General Medical Council, when a case occurs which can be worked up into a sensational article.

The concluding chapters on "economic problems," "the professions and the public," and "professionalism and the society of the future," are well done, and the whole work is a very valuable and illuminating contribution to sociological science.

FRED BULLOCK.

MOSCOW DIALOGUES : Discussions on Red Philosophy. By Julius F. Hecker. *Chapman & Hall*, 1933. 8s. 6d.

RELIGION AND COMMUNISM : A Study of Religion and Atheism in Soviet Russia. By Julius F. Hecker. *Chapman & Hall*, 1933. 8s. 6d.

Both these books are useful contributions towards our understanding of the philosophy of communism and of the way this philosophy is determining and guiding policy and action in Soviet Russia. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that without this understanding it is impossible to evaluate the significance of the transformations that are taking place in every aspect of Russia's social life. For communism is primarily a philosophy of action ; it seeks not merely to explain the universe but to change it. Communism demands the unity and interpenetration of theory and practice.

This demand is seen clearly in the efforts the Soviet Government is making to suppress institutional religion. To the communist religion is a product of class society whose function is to drug the people and give divine sanction to the exploitation of the ruling class. To abolish religion, he argues, we must destroy the social and economic conditions that give rise to it. We must abolish that structure of society in which stratification, competition, uncertainty, crisis and poverty are at a premium, and in which the emphasis is upon individual as against social solidarity. In a classless society there is no place for religion ; but in the process of achieving such a society religion must be fought

BOOK REVIEWS

against and crushed. The communist stresses, and not without justice, the close association that existed between Church and State in Tsarist Russia, and the counter-revolutionary activities the Church engaged in during the proletarian revolution. He is also not unmindful of the emotional background of religion—of the fear of disease and death and of the desire for consolation and fulfilment. But he believes he can recondition these psychological impulses and build up a new relationship between stimulus and response.

Communism plans not only in the sphere of economics but also in the sphere of ideology. It aims at creating a specific proletarian culture, a new art, ethics, and education. This does not mean, as some communists think, the rejection of all past culture. Lenin insisted upon "a clear understanding of the fact that only by an exact knowledge of culture created by the development of all humanity, only by working it over, is it possible to build a proletarian culture. The proletarian culture has not appeared from nowhere; it is not an invention of people who call themselves specialists in proletarian culture. All this is sheer nonsense. Proletarian culture must appear as a lawful development of those reserves of knowledge which mankind has attained under the yoke of capitalist society, feudal society, bureaucratic society."

Historical continuity and development are nowhere more evident than in the whole philosophy of dialectical materialism, which Dr. Hecker regards as a study of things not as fixed but in a moving continuity of interpenetrating opposites. He shows how its roots derive and trace back to Hobbes and Locke, Lamettrie, Holbach, Diderot, Spinoza (whose importance in this connexion is becoming increasingly realized) Hegel and Feuerbach; and how it was revaluated by Marx and Engels and elaborated into the theory and practice of communism. Of exceptional interest is Dr. Hecker's exposition of the more recent developments in communist thought, and of the opposition Marxian philosophers have expressed against Formalism (a movement that is growing not only in philosophy but also in sociology). Mitin, an eminent Soviet professor, rightly says that "the essence of formalism consists in an empty scholastic theorizing over the categories of dialectics. In formalism dialectics is transformed from a vital method of cognizance into a co-ordination of abstract formulas which outwardly are applied to or fitted to the contents. Formalism consists in the break which occurs in theoretic work between the form and its contents, where the logical is separated from the historical, where philosophic theory is transformed into a sequence of ideas altogether separated from the complete historical social class situation."

To have discussed in a clear and popular manner these and many

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

other problems is a worthy achievement. It is perhaps unfortunate that Dr. Hecker presents one of his books in the form of Socratic dialogues—a form which facilitates the winning of “dialectical” victories. In fact, Socratov, the communist philosopher, towers easily above his interlocutors and colleagues the professor, the humanist, the senator, and the reformist. What the rotarian and banker were doing in this august company is difficult to determine. Their moronic questions and interjections were not even amusing—they were merely distracting.

J. RUMNEY.

CHILD MARRIAGE : THE INDIAN MINOTAUR. Eleanor F. Rathbone. *Allen & Unwin*, 1934. 2s. 6d.

It is to be hoped that this excellent survey of the main facts with regard to child marriage in India, and the sensible and practical suggestions for reform, will not only reach a wide public, but will stimulate real efforts towards ending a state of affairs that is a disgrace to governed and Government alike.

It is humiliating to reflect that the British Raj in India has done hardly anything to mitigate the ghastly fate of the millions of young girls who either die or suffer untold miseries and agonies as a result of the deplorable system of child marriage in India. Miss Rathbone describes the totally inadequate steps that have so far been taken to end the system, and explains why they have failed. The recently issued Census Report of 1931 indicates the urgency of the problem by revealing the huge increase in child marriage which accompanied the passage of the Sarda Act, and the continuing enormous mortality of women due to premature maternity, bad midwifery, purdah and allied social evils.

There is nothing melodramatic about Miss Rathbone's account, which consists of a plain, accurate statement of facts, together with evidence from unimpeachable sources.

The remedies lie mainly in the hands of Indian women themselves, but those hands can never be strong enough for the task unless supported and reinforced by a forward Governmental policy, directed, on the one hand, towards improving the political and social status of women and, on the other hand, towards organizing directly an extensive campaign of propaganda and resistance to those who at present break with immunity the law prohibiting child marriage. With these objects in view, Miss Rathbone recommends wider voting rights and a larger share in administration for women, and makes suggestions for the enforcement of the law and education of public opinion. It will be a poor outlook for the future of India, however big a step be taken in the direction of self-government, if Miss Rathbone's appeal falls on deaf ears.

VERA ANSTHEY.

MODERN INDUSTRY AND THE AFRICAN. Ed. J. Merle Davis. *Macmillan*. 12s. 6d.

The discovery of extraordinarily rich deposits of copper in Northern Rhodesia is almost the latest of those unexpected turns of fortune which

BOOK REVIEWS

have brought a primitive African population into sudden and cataclysmic contact with the demands of European industry. It is unique among such events because only a few years after the full extent of the territory's mineral wealth was recognized, a disastrous slump in the price of copper resulted in the closing down of all but two of the mines whose construction, then barely completed, had concentrated in the Ndola region over 30,000 native workers. What might have been a development comparable with that of the Rand has been suspended at a stage when there is still time for those interested in its effect on the future of native society to analyse the problems involved, and be prepared with a policy against the time when production begins again to expand. That this time will come is more certain in the case of the Ndola mines than of many other areas, given their remarkably great natural advantages in addition to the low cost of native labour.

The International Missionary Council have seized the opportunity to carry out an enquiry into the effect of mining development on native life from all points of view. While its main object is to formulate a policy for the guidance of Christian missions on the spot, the report is invaluable for anyone interested in the problems of culture contact, whether as a practical administrator or a theoretical sociologist.

The new situation which the mines have created for the natives has been examined from the sociological, economic, and political aspects by Dr. Charles W. Coulter, Mr. E. A. G. Robinson, and Mr. Leo Marquard respectively. The sociological analysis—necessarily the most difficult task, and an almost insuperable one to a student limited to a six-months' enquiry—is perhaps the least successful. It is difficult to present as a single whole an account of the native social organization of a territory which is said to contain as many as sixty-nine different tribes, except in generalizations so wide as to be rather unreal, and impossible on such a basis to analyse at all thoroughly the results which the new economic impact has produced. Still, the points on which this section recommends that action should be taken are interesting. Native land is insufficient for native needs so long as the present system of cultivation is followed; improved methods should therefore be taught. Some alternative must be found to "the present chaotic economic system" in which "nearly half the able-bodied male population are periodically away from home." Education should be genuinely directed to the needs of native life. The "fear complex" which prompts Colour Bar legislation must be eradicated and a "change in attitudes" introduced into the normal relations of the two races; on these last points the process which the author envisages is not very clear.

The analysis of the economic situation, on the other hand, is wholly admirable, the more so that its author has not hesitated to trespass upon what some economists would call non-economic ground. He appreciates the immense benefits which the development of the mining industry could bring to the territory both in a higher individual standard of living and in revenues to be expended on public services, but he is aware of the grave social consequences which one-sided industrialization would produce, with the inevitable drift from the villages to the towns,

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and the substitution of the problem of unemployment for the problem of poverty. Like Dr. Coulter, he seeks the remedy in stabilization—in a future where one section of the population will remain permanently in the industrial areas, enjoying the advantages of welfare and educational schemes, and of a higher standard of material comfort, while the villages, which will have lost the revenues they now gain from wages earned at the mines, must be compensated by the development of local crafts and by a remission of that taxation which at present forces the able-bodied men to seek work outside. That the first part of this scheme is not chimerical is proved by the experience of the Union Minière, in the Belgian Congo. Mr. Robinson does not under-rate the difficulties of the second in a country where indigenous craftsmanship scarcely exists; but he sees in it the only hope for the future for that village life which, it must be remembered, *must* be maintained, not for the sake of any romantic conservatism, but because, now that the construction boom is over, it will no longer be possible for many natives who have worked at the mines to find employment there. He passes in review all the possibilities, and suggests as worthy of attention the revival of native smithing, the development of an indigenous brass industry, local weaving of imported yarn, and pottery, while Government attention might be given to facilitating native trade in general. To one accustomed to dealing (in Uganda) in cents of a shilling, it is rather astonishing to read that the proposal that farthings should be introduced—the smallest coin at present in circulation is a threepenny bit—"is usually met in Northern Rhodesia with derision."

The system of Indirect Rule, introduced five years ago, is described by Mr. Marquard in the section on Government. His conclusions as to its advantages and difficulties correspond with what has been observed elsewhere; that as far as the administration of law is concerned, this is done infinitely more satisfactorily by recognized authorities familiar with native custom than by outsiders, but that the function of legislation to meet changed circumstances does not come so readily to the traditional rulers. In Northern Rhodesia the chiefs have not that responsibility which in Tanganyika is an essential feature of their position—the administration of tribal treasuries. It is this chapter which really raises the crucial question of the future of the Territory. If Indirect Rule is to be more than the mere administrative convenience of "using the chiefs" from which Mr. Marquard distinguishes it, it presupposes a native society which will have an independent existence as a society and not become, as the native population of South Africa has become, nothing but a reservoir of labour for European needs. This is in effect the aim of an economic policy such as that outlined by Mr. Robinson. It is vain to hope that it will be adopted unless it is demanded at every opportunity by all who are interested in the defence of native interests. In offering for their advocacy a scheme of concrete, practical aims, based on an examination of the facts, the Commission has done an immense service. If it inspires similar investigations in other areas its value will be even greater.

L. P. MAIR.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Bernard (L. L.) and Jessie (M. A.). *SOCIOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*. Washington University Studies, No. 4.
- Best (H.). *BLINDNESS AND THE BLIND IN THE UNITED STATES*. Macmillan. 28s.
- Bonger (W. A.). *PROBLEMEN DER DEMOKRATIE*. Noordhoff.
- Burridge (W.). *ALCOHOL AND ANÆSTHESIA*. Williams & Norgate. 2s. 6d.
- Bushnell (D. T.). *TRIBAL MIGRATIONS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI*. Smithsonian Institute.
- Chio Kao Wang. *DISSOLUTION OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 1832-1931*. Columbia University Studies. \$2.50.
- Curtis (L.). *CIVITAS DEI*. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.
- Dickinson (R. L.) and Beam (L.). *THE SINGLE WOMAN*. Williams & Norgate. 21s.
- Dunsany (Lord). *IF I WERE DICTATOR*. Methuen. 2s. 6d.
- Eddy (Sherwood). *RUSSIA TO-DAY*. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.
- Fairchild (H. P.). *GENERAL SOCIOLOGY*. Chapman & Hall. 23s.
- Ford (P.). *WORK AND WEALTH IN A MODERN PORT*. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.
- Freudenthal (M.). *GESTALTWANDEL DER STÄDTISCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN UND PROLETÄRISCHEN HAUSWIRTSCHAFT*. Triltsch.
- Gierke (O.). *NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY, 1500-1800*. Vols. I and II. Cambridge University Press. 30s.
- Glanville (J. L.). *ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND, 1896-1905*. John Hopkins Press.
- Hecker (J. F.). *RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY*. Chapman & Hall. 8s. 6d.
- Hjort (J.). *THE RESTRICTIVE LAW OF POPULATION*. Macmillan. 1s.
- Joad (C. E. M.). *A CHARTER FOR RAMBLERS*. Hutchinson. 2s. 6d.
- Kirche, Bekenntnis und Sozialethos. *FURCHE VERLAG*. Swiss Fr. 3.20.
- McKerrow (J. C.). *RELIGION AND HISTORY*. Longmans, Green. 6s.
- McDougall (W.). *RELIGION AND THE SCIENCES OF LIFE*. Methuen. 8s. 6d.
- Manifesto. *THE FEDERATION OF PROGRESSIVE SOCIETIES AND INDIVIDUALS*. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.
- Murdock (G. P.). *OUR PRIMITIVE CONTEMPORARIES*. Macmillan. 14s.
- Overbeck (H.) and Sante (G. W.). *SAAR ATLAS*. Gotha. RM. 12.
- Peers (R.). *L'EMIGRATION DE LA CAMPAGNE À LA VILLE LIBRE DE FLORENCE*. Gyldendalske Boghandel.
- Quigley (H.) and Goldie (I.). *HOUSING AND SLUM CLEARANCE IN LONDON*. Methuen. 7s. 6d.
- Raglan (Lord). *IF I WERE DICTATOR*. Methuen. 2s. 6d.
- Seligman (C. G.). *EGYPT AND NEGRO AFRICA*. Routledge. 3s. 6d.
- Steed (H. Wickham). *A WAY TO SOCIAL PEACE*. Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.
- Willoughby (W.). *THE CAPITAL ISSUES COMMITTEE AND WAR FINANCE CORPORATION*. John Hopkins Press.
- Zollschan (I.). *DIE BEDEUTUNG DES RASSENFAKTORS*. Reinhold Verlag. Sch. 1.80.
- INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION, 1933*. Allen & Unwin. 2s.
- International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. THE STATE AND ECONOMIC LIFE*. 15s.
- LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE REGISTER, 1895-1932*. 3s. 6d.
- Union of South Africa. REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR FOR 1932*. 2s. 6d.

PERIODICALS RECEIVED

AGRAR PROBLEME	Vol. V., 1-2
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW	March
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY	March, May
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY	March, May
ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE	1934, No. 1
ARCHIVIO DI STUDI CORPORATIVI	Vol. IV., 4
ASIATIC REVIEW	April
BRITISH JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY	June
CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY	March
CHARITY ORGANISATION SOCIETY QUARTERLY	April
COLOSSEUM	March

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

CO-OPERATIVE EDUCATOR	April
COUNCIL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF RURAL ENGLAND	May, June
DEUTSCHE SIEDLUNG	Vol. II., 1-11
ECONOMIC JOURNAL	June
ECONOMICA	Feb., May
EUGENICS REVIEW	April
GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW	April
GEOGRAPHY	June
HEADWAY	May, June
HIGHWAY	April
INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION	Vol. II., 1, 2, 3
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION	March, April, May
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	March, May
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE	Jan., Feb., March, April
ISLAMIC REVIEW	March, April, May
JOURNAL OF ADULT EDUCATION	April
JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS, OPEN SPACES AND FOOTPATHS PRESERVATION SOCIETY	Jan., April
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY	Jan., Feb., March
JOURNAL OF THE KEIJO IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY	No. 6
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY	June
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY	April
KENT EDUCATION GAZETTE	April, June
LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE	April
LECTURE RECORDER	April
MAN	April, May, June
MILLGATE MONTHLY	April, May
MUSÉE SOCIAL	March, April, May
NUOVI STUDI	Jan.-April
OKONOMIE OG POLITIK	Vol. VIII., 1
PLAYING FIELDS	April
PLUS LOIN	March, April, May
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY	March
PROBATION	April
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	May
REGIONAL PLAN INFORMATION BULLETIN	Feb., May
REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE, BRUSSELS	Jan.-March
REVUE DES ETUDES CO-OPÉRATIVES	Jan.-March
REVUE DES SOCIOLOGISTES	Feb., March, May
REVUE ECONOMIQUE DE 15 U.R.S.S.	March, April, May
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE	Jan.-Feb., March-April
RIVISTA DI SOCIOLOGIA	Jan.-March
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI	March, May
ROTARY WHEEL	April, May, June
SCIENTIA	March, April, May, June
SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE	March, May
SEARCH	April
SERVICE	Vol. III., 10
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEWS	March
SOCIAL FORCES	March, May
SOCIAL RESEARCH	Feb., May
SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW	April, May
SOCIOLOGISKA REVUE	Vol. V., 1-3
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH	March-April, May-June
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	March
SOZIAL-UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	Vol. XXXII., 1
STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE	Jan.-March
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING	Vol. X., 2-3, 4-5
VESTNIK	Vol. X., 2-3, 4-5
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV	May
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG	Vol. III., 1